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ESSAY
FACIAL CHALLENGES AND FEDERALISM
Gillian E. Metzger*
This Essay addresses the question of whether challenges to legislation as
exceeding Congress'powers should be assessed on a facial or an as-applied
basis, a question that rose to the fore in the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Tennessee v. Lane. The Essay begins by arguing that what distin-
guishes a facial challenge is that it involves an attack on some general rule
embodied in the statute. Such challenges can take a broader or narrower
form, and thus the terms 'facial" and "as-applied" are best understood as
encompassing a range of possible challenges rather than as mutually exclu-
sive terms. The Court's current definition of facial challenges as targeting
all or most of a statute's applications not only exaggerates the difference be-
tween facial and as-applied challenges, it also obscures the important roles
that severability and substantive constitutional law play in the Courts treat-
ment offacial challenges. The real question raised by Lane is whether in the
Section 5 and other federalism contexts the Court should apply its ordinary
severability rules. The Essay then turns to examining the Court's precedent
and the congruence-and-proportionality test that now governs Section 5
analysis. It argues that notwithstanding the facial cast of much of the
Court's recent Section 5 and Commerce Clause precedent, the Court is not
deviating from ordinary severability rules in these decisions. The Essay con-
cludes by observing that neither the substantive content of the congruence-
and-proportionality test nor instrumental arguments justify imposition of a
special nonseverability presumption in Section 5 or in other federalism
contexts.
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INTRODUCTION
Tennessee v. Lane1 is the Supreme Court's latest installment in the
Section 5 wars. The case arose from a lawsuit brought by two paraplegics
who maintained that the wheelchair inaccessibility of some Tennessee
courthouses violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA).2 One plaintiff, George Lane, alleged that he was forced to an-
swer criminal charges in a courthouse without an elevator. As a result, he
had to crawl up two flights of stairs to attend his first hearing and was
arrested when he failed to attend subsequent hearings. The other plain-
tiff, Beverly Jones, claimed that she lost work as a court stenographer be-
cause she was unable to gain access to courtrooms. 3 The plaintiffs sought
monetary as well as injunctive relief, and thus Lane presented the ques-
tion of whether Congress could validly abrogate states' Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity for private damage actions under Title II. In a five-to-
four decision, the Court ruled that the statute represented a congruent
1. 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004).
2. Title II prohibits public entities from excluding disabled individuals from public
programs and services. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000) ("[N]o qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.").
3. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1982-83. The Court did not independently discuss Beverly
Jones' claims or discuss whether the right of court access extends to employment in a
courthouse.
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and proportional response to a pattern of the states unconstitutionally
denying disabled individuals the fundamental right of access to the
courts. Title II therefore fell within Congress' powers under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and its waiver of Eleventh Amendment im-
munity was constitutional. 4
Much of the Court's recent Section 5jurisprudence has been highly
contentious, and Lane was no exception. Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's
characterization of the congruence-and-proportionality standard as a
"flabby test" that invited 'judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven decision-
making,"5 the rest of the Court concurred that it represented the proper
inquiry if legislation falls within the Section 5 power. They also agreed on
its substantive formulation: To determine whether challenged legislation
"exhibits 'a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be pre-
vented or remedied and the means adopted to that end,"6 the Court
"identif[ies] the constitutional right... that Congress sought to enforce,"
assesses whether Congress acted in light of a pattern of state violations of
this right, and then determines whether the legislation "is an appropriate
response to [that] history and pattern of unequal treatment."7 But be-
yond this, they were deeply divided. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for
three dissenters, accused the majority of paying only "lipservice to the
'congruence and proportionality' test" by upholding Title II despite
"[t]he near-total lack of actual constitutional violations in the congres-
sional record."8 In an opinion byJustice Stevens, the majority responded
that the dissent's complaints were "puzzling, to say the least," because
"the record of constitutional violations in this case . . .far exceeds the
record in [Nevada Department of Human Resources v.] Hibbs,"9 a 2003 deci-
sion written by the ChiefJustice that had sustained the family leave provi-
sions of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) as valid Section 5
legislation. 10
The dispute between the majority and dissent in Lane, however, went
beyond disagreement over matters relating to the congruence-and-pro-
portionality test in a particular case. Instead, it centered on the general
form that Section 5 analysis should take, specifically whether a court
should assess the constitutionality of Section 5 legislation on a facial or on
an as-applied basis. Justice Stevens insisted that the appropriate ap-
proach was as-applied. He rejected the petitioner's invitation to "ex-
4. Id. at 1994.
5. Id. at 2008-09 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 1986 (opinion of the Court) (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
520 (1997)); id. at 1998 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 1988, 1992 (opinion of the Court); id. at 1998-99 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
8. Id. at 1998, 2002 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 1991-92, 1991 n.16 (opinion of the Court) (discussing Nev. Dep.'t of Human
Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003)).
10. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729-35.
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amine the broad range of Title II's applications all at once."'" For him,
the only judicially relevant question was "whether Congress had the
power under [Section] 5 to enforce the constitutional right of access to
the courts" through Title II, not whether Title II was valid in all its poten-
tial applications. 12 Chief Justice Rehnquist, by contrast, insisted that an
as-applied approach was inappropriate. In his view, the purpose of "the
congruence-and-proportionality test... [is to determine] whether Con-
gress has attempted to statutorily redefine the constitutional rights pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment." 13 Addressing Title II only as ap-
plied to the narrow issue of access to state courts simply "rig[ged] the
congruence-and-proportionality test by artificially constricting the scope
of the statute to closely mirror a recognized constitutional right."14 Ac-
cordingly, he maintained that determining whether Title II represents
appropriate Section 5 legislation required that the Court examine Title II
as a whole, in all its applications.
Whether the constitutionality of Section 5 legislation should be as-
sessed on a facial or an as-applied basis is the focus of this Essay. While
the Court frequently states that "facial" challenges are disfavored, such
challenges in fact are common in many areas of constitutional law. As
several scholars have noted, 15 the debate regarding the availability of fa-
cial challenges, in particular facial overbreadth challenges, is really a de-
bate about statutory severability-that is, whether unconstitutional text or
applications of a statute16 should be presumed severable or nonseverable
in a given context. Lane presents an opportunity to consider what the
rule should be on facial challenges and severability in the Section 5 con-
text, as well as in federalism-based challenges more generally. Interest-
ingly, in Sabri v. United States, an opinion issued on the same day as Lane,
the Court also expressly rejected a facial challenge to Spending Clause
legislation, but it did so with far less fanfare.' 7 More surprisingly still,
Sabri referred to Section 5 as an area where facial overbreadth challenges
are appropriate. Adding to the confusion is that many of the Court's
recent Section 5 decisions appear (at least at first glance) to invalidate the
statutes there challenged on facial grounds. So do two recent Commerce
Clause decisions, United States v. Lopez18 and United States v. Morrison.'9
11. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1192-93.
12. Id. at 1993.
13. Id. at 2005 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
14. Id.
15. See infra notes 59-62.
16. This point is not limited to the context of facial challenges to statutes, but applies
to any facial challenge to a governing rule. However, as the Section 5 debate focuses on
federal legislation, the discussion here will refer only to statutes.
17. 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1948-49 (2004); see also id. at 1949 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part) (refusing to join the part of the Court's opinion disapproving of facial challenges but
noting only that the Court was not questioning the ability of litigants generally to challenge
legislation as outside of Congress' constitutional powers).
18. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
19. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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These conflicting messages not only raise the question of how the Court
should approach Section 5 challenges, but also whether distinct procedu-
ral rules should govern in federalism contexts, and if so, why?
The position advanced here is that Section 5 and other congres-
sional power challenges should be subject to the ordinary presumption of
severability. At the same time, however, it is important to be clear about
what precisely constitutes a facial challenge and how the presumption of
severability operates. Often the substantive law applicable to a congres-
sional power challenge requires a court to go beyond the facts before it
and assess the targeted legislation on a more general basis. Such a chal-
lenge, I argue, is "facial," but that does not mean that a court must assess
all of a statute's applications to determine its constitutionality. Instead,
once it determines that a challenged statute is constitutional in some cir-
cumstances, including the case at hand, a court can presume any alleged
unconstitutional additional applications are severable absent evidence to
the contrary.
Part I begins with a discussion of the nature of facial challenges and
the importance of severability to the availability of such challenges. The
Court's current "no valid application" definition of facial challenges is of
recent vintage and unduly obscurant. What really distinguishes a facial
challenge is not its breadth, but that it involves an attack on the general
rule embodied in a statute. As a result, "facial" and "as-applied" are best
understood as encompassing a range of possible challenges rather than as
mutually exclusive terms. Recognition of the range of forms a facial chal-
lenge can take is important in highlighting the roles severability and sub-
stantive constitutional law play in the Court's treatment of facial
challenges.
Part II reviews the Court's approach to facial challenges and sever-
ability in the context of claims that Congress has exceeded its enumer-
ated powers. Inconsistency emerges as the dominant theme. Notably,
however, this examination reveals that notwithstanding the facial cast of
much of the Court's recent Section 5 and Commerce Clause precedent,
the Court is not deviating from ordinary severability rules in these
decisions.
Part III of the Essay then evaluates and rejects the contention that,
precedent aside, a special doctrine of nonseverability should govern in
the Section 5 context. The substantive content of the congruence-and-
proportionality test does not require formulation of a special nonsever-
ability doctrine, nor does such a doctrine follow from the general nature
of challenges to congressional power. Instrumental arguments against
severability-such as ensuring that states are not chilled from asserting
their constitutional prerogatives by the need to engage in piecemeal liti-
gation, that Congress takes federalism limits on its powers seriously, and
that the federal courts are protected from excessive and inappropriate
burdens-are equally unavailing to justify departure from settled sever-
ability principles. Indeed, an analysis of these arguments demonstrates
20051
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that a nonseverability presumption and concomitant insistence on assess-
ing the constitutionality of a Section 5 statute based on all its applications
would represent a greater move to judicial supremacy than even the
Court's recent Section 5 decisions appear to countenance. The Essay
concludes with consideration of whether federalism concerns justify a de-
parture from ordinary practice in other congressional power contexts.
I. FACIAL CHALLENGES AND SEVERABILITY
A. The Meaning of 'Facial" Challenges
The Supreme Court frequently states its disapproval of facial consti-
tutional challenges, but it voices this disapproval with varying degrees of
intensity. United States v. Salerno's well-known pronouncement is the most
extreme version: A facial challenge is "the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully" and to succeed "the challenger must establish that no
set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."'20 More
recently, in its Sabri decision last Term, the Court did not invoke the Sa-
lerno standard but agreed that "facial challenges are best when infre-
quent," and that facial overbreadth challenges in particular "are espe-
cially to be discouraged."21 This dislike of facial challenges is rooted in
institutional concerns: According to the Court, "[flacial adjudication car-
ries too much promise of premature interpretation of statutes on the ba-
sis of factually bare-bones records, '22 thereby risking "unnecessary pro-
nouncement on constitutional issues ' 23 and thus also unnecessary
intrusion on federal and state legislatures.
As several scholars and even some Justices have noted, however, in
practice the Court accepts facial challenges far more frequently than its
stated doctrine suggests. 24 First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, ac-
20. 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); see also United States v. Booker, No. 04-104, 2005 WL
50108, at "31, *32-*33 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) ("A facial
challenge may succeed if a legislative scheme is unconstitutional in all or nearly all of its
applications."); id. at *51 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part). For a discussion of the Salerno
standard, see Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan. L.
Rev. 235, 236-42 (1994); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Commentary, As-Applied and
Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1321, 1322-23 (2000)
[hereinafter Fallon, As-Applied] (detailing the Court's ongoing struggle with the Salerno
standard).
21. 124 S. Ct. at 1948; see also United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960)
(invoking general rule that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not
be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional" to reject a facial challenge to civil rights statute).
22. Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1948 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations
omitted).
23. Raines, 362 U.S. at 22.
24. See Dorf, supra note 20, at 236; Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 20, at 1323; see also
Matthew D. Adler, Rights, Rules, and the Structure of Constitutional Adjudication: A
Response to Professor Fallon, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1371, 1390 (2000) [hereinafter Adler,
Response]. But see Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the
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knowledged in Salerno itself, is often cited as the prime example, 2 5 but it
is far from the only one.26 Michael Dorf has identified several other con-
texts where the courts regularly apply facial analysis to constitutional chal-
lenges, including when litigants assert that a statute is unconstitutionally
underinclusive, was motivated by a forbidden purpose, or infringes on
fundamental rights.27 Some scholars have taken the point even further;
Matthew Adler in particular has gone so far as to contend that all consti-
tutional challenges are in some sense facial challenges. 28 Although argu-
ing that, on the contrary, all constitutional challenges "are in an impor-
tant sense as-applied," Richard Fallon similarly concurs in the assessment
that facial challenges are much more frequent than the Court admits. 29
Why this divide between the Court's stated rule and actual practice
regarding facial challenges? Part of the disconnect no doubt reflects dif-
ferences in jurisprudential ideologies. Justices who are advocates of facial
challenges in cases raising individual rights claims-such as claims against
abortion regulations-have often rejected facial challenges in cases
claiming that federal legislation exceeds Congress' enumerated powers,
Valid Rule Requirement, 48 Am. U. L. Rev. 359, 395-421 (1998) (arguing that the Salerno
standard is not as inconsistent with Supreme Court practice as critics claim). For
discussions of varying standards applied to facial challenges by Supreme Court Justices,
compare City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999) (Stevens, J.) (plurality
opinion) (stating Salerno is not the governing standard for facial challenges), with id. at
74-83 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that Salerno is the appropriate standard).
25. See, e.g., Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1948 (identifying free speech context as one area
where facial challenges are accepted); Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 (arguing that the
overbreadth doctrine has been limited to the First Amendment context).
26. What is traditionally referred to as overbreadth doctrine refers to the ability of a
litigant to claim that a statute is unconstitutional even though it potentially could be
constitutionally applied to her, because it prohibits a substantial amount of other
constitutionally protected conduct. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19
(2003). In addition to overbreadth, the Court has also been receptive to other types of
First Amendment facial challenges, such as those alleging vagueness, see Morales, 527 U.S.
at 52 (Stevens, J.) (plurality opinion), and delegation of standardless discretionary power,
see City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-62 (1988).
27. See Dorf, supra note 20, at 271-76, 279-81; see also Henry Paul Monaghan,
Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 4 (noting that overbreadth analysis should be
applicable whenever courts apply a heightened standard of review). In the abortion
context, for example, the reigning standard for availability of facial challenges appears not
to be Salerno's no-valid-applications test, but rather the same substantive standard
applicable to a challenge on the merits: An abortion regulation is invalid if it will create a
substantial obstacle to access to previability abortions in a "large fraction" of the cases
where it is relevant. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 944-45 (2000); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874, 895 (1992) (setting out undue burden standard as
substantive standard for reviewing abortion regulations and invalidating husband
notification requirement under this standard); see also Tucson Woman's Clinic v. Eden,
371 F.3d 1173, 1181 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding substantive abortion standard governs
availability of facial challenges).
28. See Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American
Constitutional Law, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 125-32, 157 (1998) [hereinafter Adler, Rights
Against Rules].
29. See Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 20, at 1335-41.
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and vice versa.3 0 It also seems likely that the Justices are less concerned
with consistency of practice than with results in particular cases.31 One
explanation of the majority's insistence on an as-applied approach in
Lane, for example, is that upholding the constitutionality of Title II only
with respect to access-to-the-court claims was necessary to obtain Justice
O'Connor's vote; the skepticism displayed by the other Justices in the
majority toward the Court's recent Section 5 jurisprudence suggests they
might have been willing to uphold Title II across the board.32
Perhaps more fundamentally, however, the disconnect also seems
caused by confusion about what constitutes a facial challenge. The dis-
tinction between facial and as-applied challenges is more illusory than the
ready familiarity of the terms suggests.3 3 The nature of a "facial" chal-
lenge is rarely explored in the case law; when a description is provided it
usually is only the unhelpful description that such a challenge targets a
statute "on its face."'3 4 Instead, facial and as-applied challenges are more
commonly differentiated by their effects. A successful facial challenge
means that the "state may not enforce [a statute] under any circum-
stances, unless an appropriate court narrows its application" so as to
30. Compare Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1992-93 (2004) (Stevens, J.)
(rejecting facial approach in Section 5 context), with Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 517
U.S. 1174, 1175-76 (1996) (mem.) (Stevens, J.) (arguing for facial challenges in the
abortion context), denying cert. to 63 F.3d 1452 (8th Cir. 1995); compare Nevada Dep't. of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 743 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that facial
challenges are proper in the Section 5 context), with Ada v. Guam Soc'y. of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 1011-12 (1992) (ScaliaJ., dissenting from denial of cert.)
(rejecting facial challenges to abortion statutes), denying cert. to 962 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir.
1992), and Morales, 527 U.S. at 77 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that it seems
"fundamentally incompatible with [the role of the federal courts in the constitutional
system] for the Court not to be content to find that a statute is unconstitutional as applied
to the person before it, but to go further and pronounce that the statute is
unconstitutional in all applications."). Professor Fallon notes this variation in the Justices'
stance on facial challenges. Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 20, at 1322-23 & n.22.
31. For example, as-applied language sometimes appears when the Court wants to
limit the sweep of its holdings on contentious questions. See, e.g., United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745, 755-56 & n.9 (1966).
32. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 376-89 (2000)
(Breyer, J.,joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that Title I of
the ADA was a valid exercise of Congress' Section 5 power). This impression of some of
the Court's Section 5 jurisprudence as essentially results-driven is reinforced by Lane's
emphasis on the paucity of evidence of unconstitutional gender discrimination underlying
the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), see 124 S. Ct. at 1992, coming as it did just one
year after all five of the Justices in the Lane majority signed onto the opinion in Hibbs
describing this evidence as sufficient to sustain that Act's constitutionality, see 538 U.S. at
735.
33. Richard Fallon has argued that "facial challenges are less categorically distinct
from as-applied challenges than is often thought." Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 20, at
1341; see also Doff, supra note 20, at 294 (stating that "[tlhe distinction between as-
applied and facial challenges may confuse more than it illuminates" and that given Article
III's case-and-controversy requirements, "[i] n some sense, any constitutional challenge to a
statute is both as-applied and facial").
34. See, e.g., Morales, 527 U.S. at 52.
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render it constitutional; a successful as-applied challenge still allows the
state to "enforce the statute in different circumstances. '35 In fact, ordi-
nary rules of preclusion and stare decisis make this contrast in effects far
less stark: The preclusive effect of a successful facial challenge will de-
pend on the level of court that issues the decision, and stare decisis
means successful as-applied challenges often generate results that are not
specific to a particular challenger. 36
Despite the Court's failure to clarify what it means by a facial chal-
lenge, a definition can be inferred from Salerno's "no valid application"
requirement. This requirement indicates that in the Court's view a facial
challenge must target a statute's constitutionality in all its applications,
whereas as-applied challenges are those that simply target the statute's
application in a particular context.37 Yet no logical reason exists why a
litigant could not make a partial facial challenge-that is, allege that part
of a statutory provision is unconstitutional or that a statute is unconstitu-
tional in a particular range of applications, even if not unconstitutional in
all or most.38 On this view, what differentiates facial and as-applied chal-
lenges is not the breadth of the challenge, but the nature of the claim
being asserted: A facial challenge is one that "puts into issue an explicit
rule of law, as formulated by the legislature or the court, and involves the
facts only insofar as it is necessary to establish that the rule served as a
basis of decision."3 9
35. Dorf, supra note 20, at 236; see also Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003)
("The showing that a law punishes a substantial amount of protected free speech ...
suffices to invalidate all enforcement of that law, until and unless a limiting construction or
partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to
constitutionally protected expression." (citations omitted)).
36. See Fallon, As-Applied,.supra note 20, at 1336-41.
37. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (stating that to make out a
successful facial challenge "the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid"); see also Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1948
(2004) (describing facial challenges "in the strictest sense" as ones where "no application
of the statute could be constitutional"); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 501-06
(1985) (holding partial invalidation rather than facial invalidation is appropriate where
parties challenging statute seek to engage in very speech that statute is overbroad for
prohibiting and partial invalidation accords with state law).
38. See Alfred Hill, Some Realism About Facial Invalidation of Statutes, 30 Hofstra L.
Rev. 647, 648-52 (2001) (noting instances where the Court has invalidated part of a statute
or particular applications on facial challenge).
39. Paul M. Bator et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal
System 662 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter Hart & Wechsler, Third Edition]; see also Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1993) ("[T]his is a facial challenge .... Respondents do not
challenge its application in a particular instance .... We have only the regulation itself and
the statement of basis and purpose that accompanied its promulgation . . . ."); Adler,
Rights Against Rules, supra note 28, at 157 n.541 (describing facial challenges as ones
which focus exclusively on the predicate and history of a statutory rule, as contrasted with
as-applied "adjudication that depends, in part, on facts about the claimant"); Monaghan,
supra note 27, at 8 ("[A] challenge to the content of the rule applied is independent of the
specific facts of the litigant's predicament. Rather, it speaks to the relationship between
2005]
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Notably, until Salerno uprooted the traditional orthodoxy, facial chal-
lenges were understood to include such context-specific challenges to
general rules because as-applied challenges were defined in fairly narrow
terms synonymous with claims of privilege. The third edition of Hart and
Wechsler's Federal Courts casebook provides a good example. After of-
fering the foregoing definition of a facial challenge, the third edition
stated that "[c]hallenges to the validity of a statute as applied to specific
facts, on the other hand, turn necessarily on a determination of what the
adjudicative facts were . . . [and] can always be rephrased simply as an
assertion of a federal right or immunity with respect to the operative
facts."'40 Both definitions are absent from the current fifth edition, which
instead discusses the Salerno standard for facial challenges. 41 United States
v. Carolene Products,42 most famous, of course, for its footnote four, also
displays this view of as-applied challenges. There, the Court upheld a
federal statute prohibiting shipment of filled milk against a facial chal-
lenge while noting that an as-applied challenge might lie: "[W]e recog-
nize that the constitutionality of a statute, valid on its face, may be as-
sailed by proof of facts tending to show that the statute as applied to a
particular article is without support in reason . . . . 4 This as-applied
challenge the Court left open is really a fact-based claim of privilege or
immunity-that congressional regulation of a particular article or activity
is not rational given its specific characteristics-as opposed to a challenge
to the general rule embodied in the congressional regulation in question.
The net effect of the current Salerno approach is that facial chal-
lenges now operate solely at the wholesale level, encompassing only
across-the-board claims of unconstitutionality, while as-applied challenges
include more limited attacks on a statute as unconstitutional in a particu-
lar range of cases as well as fact-based claims based on a specific applica-
tion. Nothing precludes this approach in principle, provided it is then
recognized that both facial and as-applied challenges can involve attacks
on the constitutionality of some general rule. But the Court's restrictive
definition of facial challenges sows confusion, precisely because this cru-
cial proviso is often overlooked. As the ensuing examination of congres-
sional power cases reveals, the applicable substantive law may at times
necessitate looking beyond the facts of the case at hand. This does not
mean, however, that the Court must consider all applications or dimen-
the facial content of the rule being applied to the facts and applicable constitutional
law .... ").
40. Hart & Wechsler, Third Edition, supra note 39, at 662; see also Monaghan, supra
note 27, at 5. While as-applied challenges were thus viewed as largely the equivalent of
claims of privilege or immunity, how such challenges were stylized did affect the availability
of review in the Supreme Court as of right; such review was available only for as-applied
challenges. See Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 289 (1921).
41. See Richard H. Fallon et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and The
Federal System 194-96 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter Hart & Wechsler, Fifth Edition].
42. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
43. Id. at 153-54.
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sions of a statute to determine if Congress exceeded its powers. Rather, a
range of challenges are possible, with Salerno-style facial challenges and
privileged-based as-applied challenges representing polar extremes in-
stead of mutually exclusive categories. 44
Take Lane as an example. The Court there was not restricted to a
choice between considering the constitutionality of Title II in its entirety
or only as applied to enforcing the fundamental right of access to the
courts. It could instead have assessed the constitutionality of Title II as
applied to enforcing fundamental rights generally. Alternatively, it could
have addressed Title II only as a means of enforcing specifically the rights
of access of criminal defendants or court employees; indeed, ChiefJustice
Rehnquist faulted the majority for viewing the right of court access in too
general terms.4 5 While the latter approach would be more tied to the
facts of Lane itself, the challenge would still be "facial," in that the con-
tours of the claims at issue are not unique to the plaintiffs in the case-
the question is still the statute's constitutionality viewed in general terms.
Some of these lines might seem more or 'less plausible, but in theory all
are available unless the Court were to conclude that Title II could not be
severed in such a fashion.
B. The Role of Severability
Defining facial challenges Salerno-style as leading to total invalida-
tion-that is, no valid applications-not only exaggerates the difference
between facial and as-applied challenges, it also obscures the crucial role
played by severability doctrine. The claim that a statute is unconstitu-
tional in all its applications is usually quite implausible; a little imagina-
tion suffices to produce at least one potentially constitutional application;
indeed often it produces a fair number of constitutional applications. 46
What underlies a litigant's claim that a statute cannot be constitutionally
44. See David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding
Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 808, 884-86 (2004)
(discussing "continuum [that] exists between pure as-applied challenges and facial
challenges that ask a court to strike down rules in their entirety"); see also Fallon, As-
Applied, supra note 20, at 1334-35 (emphasizing availability of partial challenges to
statutory rules).
45. See Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1999-2002 (2004). Dispute over how
precisely the constitutional rights at issue must be identified also surfaced in Hibbs.
Compare Nevada Dep't. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729-34 (2003) (detailing
evidence of state gender discrimination in employment), with id at 745-46, 749 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court "sets the contours of the inquiry at too high a level
of abstraction" and that the real question was "whether, notwithstanding the passage of
Title VII and similar state legislation, the States continued to engage in widespread
discrimination . . . in the provision of family leave benefits").
46. See Dorf, supra note 20, at 239-41; see also City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S.
41, 81-82 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the government should be able to
defeat a facial challenge "by conjuring up a single valid application of the law" and
providing such an example based on the musical West Side Story (emphasis omitted)).
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applied is therefore the argument that the unconstitutional and constitu-
tional aspects of a statute cannot be severed.
1. Ordinary Severability Doctrine. - Although not always applied con-
sistently, the standard rules governing severability are fairly well estab-
lished.4 7 Courts ordinarily apply a presumption of severability and sever
any unconstitutional provisions or applications of a statute rather than
hold it facially invalid. 48 Of course, a court will "impose a limiting con-
struction on a statute only if it is 'readily susceptible' to such a construc-
tion. '49 Severability in regard to federal statutes is ostensibly a question
of congressional intent and functionality: Would Congress have enacted
the remaining provisions without the severed portions, and can the re-
maining portions function independently?50 But severability doctrine
47. Compare, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 172-73, 183-84 (1983)
(holding statute prohibiting display of flags, banners, or devices in the "Supreme Court
building and on its grounds" unconstitutional only as applied to public sidewalks
surrounding the Court), with United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S.
454, 477-79 & n.26 (1995) (enjoining enforcement of broad honoraria ban covering all
federal employees only as applied to executive branch employees below grade GS-16 but
refusing to only enjoin enforcement insofar as employee speech did not bear a nexus to
each employee's job, due to a concern that imposing a nexus requirement not in the
statute would represent a "serious invasion of the legislative domain"), with Wyoming v.
Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 460-61 (1992) (refusing to sever potential constitutional
application of Oklahoma statute notwithstanding statute's severability clause which under
state law created a presumption of severability, because severability clause authorized
severing "any part or provision . . . held void," and did not refer to severing
unconstitutional applications). For a discussion of the Court's inconsistency regarding
severability, see Michael D. Shumsky, Severability, Inseverability, and the Rule of Law, 41
Harv. J. on Legis. 227, 232-45 (2004). See generally Robert L. Stem, Separability and
Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 76 (1937) (describing
severability decisions in the period after the Civil War through the early New Deal).
48. See United States v. Sabri, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1948 (2004); Brockett v. Spokane
Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 501-03 (1985); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960).
Although the full Court has not expressly adopted such a presumption, it lies implicit in
the Court's approach to severability and facial challenges. See John Copeland Nagle,
Severability, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 203, 218-25 (1993) (discussing presumptions of severability);
infra text accompanying notes 62-64; see also Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 653
(1984) (plurality opinion) (adopting presumption of severability); Champlin Refining Co.
v. Corp. Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932) ("Unless it is evident that the legislature would
not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which
is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.").
49. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884-85 (1997) (citation omitted). Such
susceptibility may turn on the availability of a "clear line" supported by statutory text or
legislative intent that the Court could use to trim a statute to constitutional confines. Id;
see also Morales, 527 U.S. at 55 (plurality opinion) (finding severability impossible where
"vagueness permeates the text of [a criminal] law"). It is also dependent on the
substantive constitutional requirements that a statute must meet. See infra notes 64-66
and accompanying text.
50. See Hart & Wechsler, Fifth Edition, supra note 41, at 182-84 (describing
severability doctrine as applied to federal statutes); see also Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock,
480 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1987) (setting out rules governing severability of federal statutes).
In regard to state statutes, severability is a question of state law; while the federal courts
also apply a presumption of severability and focus on legislative intent if no authoritative
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also contains an important yet little-noticed judicial feature: Legislative
intent to the side, can the court formulate a satisfying limiting principle
to constrain the statute? If not, severing unconstitutional applications is
not an option and the court will resort to full invalidation.
Severability is often conceived of as a measure of the feasibility of
separating some linguistically distinct statutory text from other parts of
the provision as a whole.5 1 But frequently the question instead will be
one of application severability: whether a court can sever unconstitu-
tional applications of a single statutory provision.5 2 Intuitively, applica-
tion severability may seem ajudicial endeavor of more dubious legitimacy
than text severability, as a court must draw lines not found in the statute's
language. In fact, however, severing unconstitutional applications is
functionally equivalent to the well-established judicial practice of nar-
rowly construing statutory provisions to avoid constitutional problems.5 3
state construction exists, rulings on severability by a state's highest court are binding. See
Hart & Wechsler, Fifth Edition, supra note 41, at 182-84; see also Leavitt v. Jane L., 518
U.S. 137, 139 (1996) (per curiam) (noting whether provisions in state statute are severable
is question of state law).
51. See, e.g., Reno, 521 U.S. at 882-83 (severing term "or indecent" from statute
regulating "any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication
which is obscene or indecent" (citations omitted)).
52. See, e.g., Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912)
(presuming severability of application of statutory settlement requirement to frivolous
claims and thus upholding statute against constitutional challenge); Adrian Vermeule,
Saving Constructions, 85 Geo. L.J. 1945, 1950 n.26 (1997) (noting the similarities between
text and application severability); see also United States v. Booker, No. 04-104, 2005 WL
50108, at *51, *54 (U.S. Jan 12, 2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) ("The severability
issue may arise when a court strikes either a provision of a statute or an application of a
provision."). But see id. at *31, *36 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (rejecting claim
that courts "must engage in severability analysis if a statute is unconstitutional in only some
of its applications" and characterizing cases that sever unconstitutional applications as
actually "about constitutional avoidance"). The Court's recent Booker decision is discussed
in greater detail at infra Part I.B.3.
53. The modern progenitor of this practice, referred to as the canon of constitutional
avoidance, is Justice Brandeis' concurrence in Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S.
288, 341 (1936). Viewed theoretically, the practices of severability and avoidance differ
somewhat. In severing, a court first rules definitively on whether an application of a statute
is constitutional, implicitly if not explicitly concluding that the statute should be read to
apply in the challenged fashion. It then asks whether the legislature would have intended
the constitutional part of the statute to stand on its own. In construing a statute narrowly,
a court does not definitively rule that a particular application is unconstitutional. Rather,
it finds that because such an application would raise serious constitutional doubts and an
alternative plausible interpretation is available, the statute should not be read as including
the questionable application. See Stuart Buck & Mark L. Rienzi, Federal Courts,
Overbreadth, and Vagueness: Guiding Principles for Constitutional Challenges to
Uninterpreted State Statutes, 2002 Utah L. Rev. 381, 391-95, 400-04 (describing
distinction between modern doctrines of severability and avoidance). In terms of their
effects on the legislation in question, however, the two practices are functionally the same.
That said, this distinction between severability and avoidance may affect the frequency
with which courts limit a statute's application, as courts may be more willing to find that a
statute raises serious constitutional doubts than that it is in fact unconstitutional. See
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
Moreover, excising express text that Congress has intentionally included
in a statute could be seen as far more of an intrusion into the legislative
sphere than excising a particular application that Congress may not have
considered at all.
In any event, the case law does not support drawing a strict distinc-
tion between text severability and application severability. 54 The Court
has applied severability in both contexts, and its inquiry in both is the
same: Is severability consistent with legislative intent? In United States v.
National Treasury Employees Union, for example, the Court relied on its as-
sessment of congressional intent to enjoin a ban on receiving honoraria
only as applied to lower-level executive branch employees, notwithstand-
ing that no such distinction among types of employees was contained in
the text of the statute.5 5 The difference between these two forms of sev-
erability, to the extent there is one, is that a court may be more confident
in finding that the legislature intended statutory text to be severed and
thus that it can craft a constitutional construction without overstepping
its judicial role, than in finding that it can sever particular applications of
a single statutory term. 56 Indeed, it is fair to say that an almost automatic
Vermeule, supra note 52, at 1955-63. Another potential divergence, highlighted by the
Court's recent decision in Clark v. Suarez Martinez, No. 03-7434, 2005 WL 50099 (U.S. Jan.
12, 2005), is that the route of constitutional avoidance may have greater implications for
other statutory challenges than does severance. In Clark, the Court held that its prior
reading of the Immigration and Naturalization Act's removal provision as only authorizing
"reasonably necessary" detention of admitted aliens, presumptively a period of six months,
required as a matter of statutory construction that it read the provision similarly in regard
to inadmissible aliens. See id. at *4-*6. The Court had adopted this interpretation in
Zadvydas v. Davis out of concern that reading the removal provision as authorizing
indefinite detention of admitted aliens would raise serious due process concerns. 533 U.S.
678, 690-96 (2001). If, instead, the Court had read the provision as authorizing such
indefinite detention and severed its application in regard to admitted aliens, it might have
remained open for the Court in Clark to uphold the availability of indefinite detention in
regard to inadmissible aliens. "Might" is a key qualifier, however, because the Court would
first have had to hold that this aspect of the provision's application to admitted aliens was
severable.
54. See Hart & Wechsler, Fifth Edition, supra note 41, at 182 (discussing both text
and application severability).
55. 513 U.S. 454, 477-79 (1995); see also Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S.
491, 501-06 (1985) (partially invalidating state obscenity statute "only insofar as the word
'lust' is taken to include normal interest in sex" after determining that such partial
invalidation accorded with state legislature's intent); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,
172-73, 183-84 (1983) (invalidating statute prohibiting display of flags, banners, or
devices in the "Supreme Court building and on its grounds" only as applied to public
sidewalks surrounding the Court, even though provision made no separate mention of
sidewalks).
56. See, e.g., Reno, 521 U.S. at 882-84 (severing constitutional portion of statute that
"enjoy[ed] a [separate] textual manifestation" but refusing to narrowly construe
remainder of statute to avoid unconstitutional applications because "open-ended character
of the [statute] provides no guidance whatever for limiting its coverage" in accordance
with congressional intent); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 460-61 (1992) (refusing
to sever potentially constitutional applications of a state statute on grounds that doing so
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rule of severability applies in many text severability contexts; to give an
extreme example, it goes without saying that invalidation of one statute,
even a statute the various provisions of which are held inseparable from
each other, does not invalidate separately enacted or unrelated sections
of the U.S. Code.57
2. Severability and the Availability of Facial Challenges. - Although the
Court rarely acknowledges the role severability plays in its assessment of
constitutional challenges, 58 existing scholarship generally agrees that the
debate regarding the availability of facial challenges is, at bottom, funda-
mentally a debate about severability. 59 Severability's centrality follows
from the basic (though rarely acknowledged) proposition that "a liti-
gant.. . always ha[s] the right to be judged in accordance with a constitu-
tionally valid rule of law," whether or not her own conduct is constitution-
ally privileged.60 If unconstitutional applications are not severed, the
would transform the statute into "a fundamentally different piece of legislation" and
emphasizing that "it is clearly not this Court's province to rewrite a state statute").
57. I thank Mike Doff for this point.
58. Instead, it simply notes in rejecting a facial challenge that an as-applied challenge
might still lie. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004) provides a recent
example. There, the Court rejected the petitioner's Fourth and Fifth Amendment
challenges to a Nevada law requiring that individuals identify themselves when stopped
under a reasonable suspicion of having engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 2457-61. But
the Court qualified its rejection of the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim by noting
that "a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the
time of a stop" would be incriminating, and concluded-without mentioning severability
by name-that in such a case, "the court can then consider whether the [Fifth
Amendment] privilege applies." Id. at 2461.
59. See Monaghan, supra note 27, at 3-6; see also Doff, supra note 20, at 249-51;
Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 20, at 1331-33. Marc Isserles argues that severability is only
relevant to analysis of a facial overbreadth challenge, and not to what he terms "a valid rule
facial challenge," which "seeks to show that, under the statute as it is currently written and
authoritatively construed, the underlying substantive constitutional doctrine dictates that
there is 'no set of circumstances' in which the statute can be constitutionally applied."
Isserles, supra note 24, at 387 (citation omitted). Severability in his view is irrelevant here
"because a statute with no constitutional applications cannot be saved from invalidity by
severing the unconstitutional applications." Id. But insofar as a court in construing a
statute either severs or refuses to sever unconstitutional applications, its actions may well
determine whether such a challenge will succeed. The Court's decision in Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) is a good case in point. The Court held that Nebraska's
"partial birth" abortion ban was facially invalid in part because it imposed a substantial
burden on women's availability to obtain a previability abortion by covering dilation and
evacuation procedures. See id. at 938-39. However, the Court's decision suggests that this
constitutional infirmity might have been cured if the statute could have been read as
applying only to dilation and extraction procedures. See id. at 938-45.
60. Monaghan, supra note 27, at 3. Scholars generally agree that the valid rule
requirement is a basic constitutional principle. See, e.g., Doff, supra note 20, at 242-44,
246-49 (accepting the valid rule requirement and offering justification for it based on
Marbury v. Madison's theory of judicial review and resultant concept of the rule of law, as
well as the Supremacy Clause); Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 20, at 1331-33 (arguing that
the "valid rule requirement is fundamental" and while "it is hard to identify direct judicial
affirmations of the valid rule requirement.., a doctrinal home could easily be found in
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statute cannot be applied to any litigant, even one making no claim of
constitutional protection for her conduct.6 1 On the other hand, if un-
constitutional applications of a statute can be severed, refusing to apply
the statute to conduct that is not constitutionally protected becomes un-
justified. 62 Viewed through the lens of the valid rule requirement, there-
fore, the Court's reluctance to entertain facial challenges is justifiable
only if seen as embodying a presumption of severability-in the case of
Salerno, as Michael Dorf has argued, a nearly irrebuttable presumption. 63
Scholars also agree that, given the role played by severability, the
availability of facial challenges ultimately turns on the substantive consti-
tutional doctrines that govern in a particular area. Many doctrines are
compatible with the presumption of severability. But in some areas the
applicable substantive law makes narrowing a statute to fit constitutional
limits a more difficult task. When the standard of constitutional review is
heightened-as occurs, for example, with application of a least restrictive
means requirement-the likelihood increases that a statute will be un-
constitutional in a significant number of its applications, and accordingly
that attempts to sever these invalid applications will render the statute
the Due Process Clause"); see also Isserles, supra note 24, at 389-95 (disagreeing with
Monaghan's characterization of overbreadth challenges as personal challenges based on
the valid rule requirement rather than third-party challenges, but agreeing that valid rule
challenges represent a basic category of facial challenges).
The most prominent attack on the valid rule requirement has come from Matthew
Adler, who argues both that the valid rule requirement is not reflected in Supreme Court
doctrine and that it wrongly views constitutional rights as personal rights rather than as
rights against rules. See Adler, Response, supra note 24, at 1395-1406. However, the
conflict between Adler's view and the valid rule requirement appears more theoretical
than real. Adler acknowledges that courts may respond to an invalid rule by either facial
or partial invalidation. See Adler, Rights Against Rules, supra note 28, at 125-32, 158. If a
court invalidates the rule, then in keeping with the valid rule requirement, it will not be
applied to an individual; if on the other hand, a court responds by severing the rule's
unconstitutional applications, the "amended" rule is valid and thus its application, even
retrospectively, does not necessarily violate the valid rule requirement. See Adler,
Response, supra note 24, at 1405; see also Monaghan, supra note 27, at 3, 8-10 (arguing
that while a rule with unconstitutional applications is invalid in regard to any litigant, it can
be applied to those engaging in unprotected conduct if it can be narrowed to fit
constitutional requirements). In any event, Adler agrees on the importance of severability
to facial challenges. See Adler, Rights Against Rules, supra note 28, at 158 ("Facial
challenge doctrine . . . is a doctrine that answers the question: Where a rule is
constitutionally invalid, should the reviewing court repeal the invalid rule, or should the
court instead amend the rule in some way?").
61. Cf. Clark v. Suarez Martinez, No. 03-878, 2005 WL 50099 , at *6 (U.S. Jan. 12,
2005) (arguing that a litigant invoking the canon of constitutional avoidance in defense of
a statutory interpretation is "not attempting to vindicate the constitutional rights of
others... [but] his own statutory rights," even if the constitutional problems he articulates
relate to the statute's application to individuals not before the court).
62. See Monaghan, supra note 27, at 6 n.22, 9, 17 (noting fair warning and vagueness
concerns may still preclude application).
63. See Doff, supra note 20, at 238, 250; see also Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 20, at
1333; Monaghan, supra note 27, at 5-7.
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nonfunctioning or excessively vague. 6 4 Some argue that, in addition, pro-
phylactic concerns with chilling constitutional rights justify nonsever-
ability presumptions and broad third-party standing rules; First Amend-
ment overbreadth doctrine is traditionally defended on this basis,
although Henry Monaghan has famously critiqued this view.65 Even the
Court, although retaining its attraction to the idea of a general rule gov-
erning facial challenges, has acknowledged that the availability of such
challenges does vary with context and that in a few "limited settings" sub-
stantive concerns have justified greater use of facial challenges. 66
As a result, viewing the issue in Lane as the availability of facial chal-
lenges is misleading. A litigant should always be able to bring a facial
challenge even of the Salerno variety, alleging that a statute by its terms
has inseparable unconstitutional applications. Where severability is pre-
cluded-most commonly by a state supreme court's interpretation of a
challenged state statute-a federal court has no choice but to hold the
statute invalid in toto if it accepts the claim of unconstitutional applica-
tions.67 In other contexts, however, a court may respond by accepting
the claim of unconstitutionality but disagreeing about severability, with
the result that the statute is then enjoined or declared invalid in part to
the extent it affects the plaintiff. Yet the possibility of this result justifies
denying availability of such a facial challenge in the first place only when
the litigant is not herself potentially subject to the unconstitutional appli-
cation and a presumption of severability applies.
6 8
64. See Monaghan, supra note 27, at 17-18, 24-25; see also Doff, supra note 20, at
251-64, 281-82; Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 20, at 1342, 1350-51.
65. Compare Monaghan, supra note 27, at 3, 21-30 (denying that First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine embodies a nonseverability presumption or special standing rules),
with Doff, supra note 20, at 263-64 (stating that First Amendment overbreadth doctrine
reflects special standing rules), and Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth,
100 Yale L.J. 853, 867-75, 898-900 (1991) [hereinafter Fallon, Making Sense] (arguing
that the Court applies a nonseverability presumption and special standing rules in First
Amendment overbreadth cases).
66. See Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1948-49 (2004).
67. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363-64 (2003); Bd. of Airport Comm'rs
of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574-76 (1987). For this reason, the Court's
recent decision in Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 121-24 (2003), where it presumed a
housing authority's trespass policy had inseparable unconstitutional applications yet
nonetheless upheld the policy's enforcement, seems dubious. The only explanation for
the result in Hicks stems from the fact that the Virginia Supreme Court did not expressly
rule on severability, but instead implicitly held the policy was inseparable by enjoining it in
its entirety. Hicks suggests that the Court is not willing to adhere to such implicit state
court holdings of nonseverability, at least where a rule's unconstitutional applications
appear inconsequential.
68. Ordinary severability rules preclude bringing overbreadth challenges because the
assumption is that any unconstitutional applications could be severed, and thus actually
resolving the question of their constitutionality is not necessary to decide the case at hand.
See, e.g., Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1948 (arguing that facial overbreadth challenges are disfavored
for this reason); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960) ("The delicate power of
pronouncing an Act of Congress unconstitutional is not to be exercised with reference to
hypothetical cases thus imagined.").
20051
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
The real question raised by Lane is instead how should the Court
approach severability in the Section 5 context: Should it apply its ordi-
nary severability rules and presume unconstitutional applications are sev-
erable, or on the contrary presume nonseverability? The answer to this
question determines whether the constitutionality of Section 5 legislation
should be assessed facially in the contemporary sense-that is, in light of
all of the statute's applications-or on a more limited basis.
3. United States v. Booker. - This Term's decision in United States v.
Booker69 on the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
gave the Court occasion to address severability and its impact on the avail-
ability of facial challenges. In Booker, the Court by a 5-4 majority held that
the Sentencing Act and Federal Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitu-
tional insofar as they require a judge to impose a sentence higher than
the statutory maximum based on facts not proved to ajury beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.70 The Court then faced a difficult remedial question:
whether to sever those provisions of the Sentencing Act that made the
Guidelines mandatory; uphold the existing federal sentencing system, but
require that any fact used by a judge to enhance a sentence beyond the
statutory maximum be proven to a jury unless the defendant waives her
Sixth Amendment rights; or invalidate the federal sentencing system as a
whole, deeming the unconstitutional applications of the system insepara-
ble. A different 5-4 majority adopted the first remedial option and, by
excising the mandatory provisions of the Act, rendered the Guidelines
advisory;71 the four dissenting Justices argued for the second approach,
"engraft[ing]" the "Sixth Amendment 'jury trial' requirement" onto the
existing system. 72
In its articulation of the rules governing severability analysis, the
Booker Court adhered to two princples that guide established doctrine:
Severability is determined by "looking to legislative intent", and a court
"must retain those portions of [a statute] that are (1) constitutionally
valid, (2) capable of 'functioning independently,' and (3) consistent with
Congress' basic objectives in enacting the statute. -7 3 The Court's applica-
tion of these principles, however, was more unusual,7 4 in particular its
creation of a new standard of appellate review-"reasonableness"-to re-
place the largely de novo standard of review expressly set out in the Act
69. No. 04-104, 2005 WiFL 50108 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2005).
70. See id. at *8-*14 (Stevens, J., opinion of the Court).
71. See id. at *15-*18 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court). Only Justice Ginsburg
joined both parts of the Court's decision.
72. Id. at *16.
73. See id. at *16, *24 (citations omitted).
74. Or, as the dissenters put it, "extraordinary," "creative," see id. at *31-*32 (Stevens,
J., dissenting in part), and making sense "[o]nly in Wonderland," id. at *49 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting in part).
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that it excised. 75 Its facial invalidation of provisions of the Sentencing Act
that were capable of constitutional application was also notable. 76
Certainly, grounds exist to question whether the majority's interpre-
tation accords with Congress' intent in adopting the Sentencing Act; in
the words of Justice Scalia, it is "wonderfully ironic ... [that in] order to
rescue from nullification a statutory scheme designed to eliminate discre-
tionary sentencing, it discards the provisions that eliminate discretionary
sentencing. ' 77 On the other hand, both the majority's and the dissent-
ers' efforts to determine whether, in light of the Court's Sixth Amend-
ment holding, Congress would have chosen to retain judge-based sen-
tencing or nondiscretionary sentencing seem impossibly counterfactual,
given the centrality of both these features to the sentencing system Con-
gress established. 78 Hence, if congressional intent were really the Court's
touchstone, the better course would have been to invalidate the federal
sentencing system in its entirety.
The unwillingness of both the majority and the dissents to counte-
nance total invalidation demonstrates the potency of the presumption of
severability. 79 This unwillingness was also no doubt enhanced by the tre-
mendous disruptive potential of total invalidation of the federal sentenc-
ing system, making it highly unlikely that either the current Congress or
the Congress that enacted the Sentencing Act would prefer that option.
Indeed, the majority made clear that it saw the Court's remedy issue pri-
marily in terms of fashioning an interim measure until Congress could
act; as it stated, "[o] urs, of course, is not the last word: The ball now lies
in Congress' court."80 As an interim measure, the majority's approach
has much to recommend it; sentencing will proceed largely as before,
albeit with the major caveat that judges will now have the freedom to
deviate from Guidelines ranges that they previously lacked, but with some
protection against radical departures.
The majority's facial invalidation of the mandatory provisions of the
Sentencing Act provoked the most sustained criticism from the dissents-
but from a methodological perspective at least, unwarrantedly so. Both
Justice Stevens (joined by justices Souter and Scalia) and Justice Thomas
75. See id. at *24-*25 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court). In particular, the relevant
provision provided for de novo review of departures from the applicable Guideline range.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2000).
76. See Booker, 2005 WL 50108, at *24-*27 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court).
77. Id. at *47 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
78. See, e.g., id. at *18-*23 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court) (arguing that Congress
sought to achieve its goal of greater uniformity through a system ofjudge-based sentencing
in which sentences are based on "the real conduct that underlies the crime of conviction"
(emphasis omitted)); id. at *41-*45 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that
"Congress' unequivocal demand [was] that the Guidelines operate as a binding system,"
and that Congress had considered and rejected an advisory regime).
79. See id. at *24 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court); id. at *36 (Stevens, J., dissenting
in part); id. at *55-*56 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part).
80. See id. at *28 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court).
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contended that the proper approach was instead to prohibit unconstitu-
tional applications of the statutes, although they disagreed as to whether
severability was the proper mode of analysis. Justice Thomas, along with
the majority, treated the remedial question as one of application sever-
ability. Justice Stevens, however, maintained that when some but not all
of a provision's applications are unconstitutional, the governing analysis
is the doctrine of constitutional avoidance rather than severability, the
question being whether the provision in question could be construed so
as to avoid the unconstitutional applications.8' As noted earlier, this is
largely a distinction without a difference.8 2 Of the two, Justice Thomas'
statement that while "[s] everability of provisions is perhaps more visible,"
nonetheless "severability questions arise from unconstitutional applica-
tions of statutes as well" is the better account of the Court's precedents.8 3
More significant was Justice Stevens' further claim that the Court
lacked authority to facially invalidate provisions that could have constitu-
tional applications.8 4 This claim is wrong as a matter of precedent; al-
though rare, the Court has on occasion enjoined or invalidated all appli-
cations of a statute that it recognized could have some constitutional
applications.8 5 It also is wrong as a matter of logic. As Justice Stevens
acknowledged, the unconstitutionality of some parts of a statute may
force its invalidation as a whole if those provisions are not severable;8 6 the
reason for this is of course the valid rule requirement. Similarly, if a pro-
vision's unconstitutional applications cannot be severed or construed
away, then on the same reasoning the provision cannot be constitution-
ally applied at all; no basis exists on which to distinguish these two situa-
tions. Justice Stevens' statement that "the Court simply has no authority
to invalidate legislation absent a showing that it is unconstitutional"8 7 is
true but irrelevant, because when a provision's unconstitutional applica-
tions are inextricable, the provision is unconstitutional.
81. See id. at *54-*57 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part); id. at *36 & n.6 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting in part).
82. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
83. See Booker, 2005 WL 50108, at *54-*55 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part); supra
notes 52-56 and accompanying text. One reason that comparatively few decisions exist
engaging in application severability is that the Court rarely discusses severability when it
upholds a statute's constitutionality, and thus the practice of application severability (like
the presumption of severability) is usually implicit. For an example see supra note 58.
84. See Booker, 2005 WL 50108, at *32-*37 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
85. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874-79, 883-84 (1997) (excising reference
to "indecent material" from federal statute as a violation of the First Amendment while
acknowledging that a more narrowly tailored prohibition to protect children might be
constitutional, but refusing to adopt a narrowing construction on grounds that the statute
was not "readily susceptible" to one); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 459-60 (1992)
(facially invalidating statutory provision requiring that generating plants located in and
producing power for sale in Oklahoma burn mixture containing at least ten percent
Oklahoma-mined coal, despite potential constitutional application to state-run facility).
86. See Booker, 2005 WL 50108, at *36 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
87. Id.
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The essence of Justice Stevens' position was really that where a stat-
ute has constitutional and unconstitutional applications, a Court should
always adopt a construction that preserves the constitutional applications
rather than facially invalidating it. Justice Thomas appeared to agree, al-
though he voiced the point in terms of severability analysis.8 8 Their posi-
tion has some bite as a prudential norm urging courts to forego radical
surgery-and in that vein stands as a close cousin to the presumption of
severability and the disfavoring of facial challenges generally. But as a
hard and fast rule, it is unpersuasive. Once a court has determined that a
statute has unconstitutional applications, the question becomes what is
the most plausible means of construing the statute to be constitutional. If
the court determines that excising statutory provisions, despite the radi-
cal character of this approach, is most in keeping with congressional in-
tent, then it should excise-its warrant for doing so stemming from its
determination that the statute in current form is unconstitutional.8 9
In Booker, the majority determined that the engraftment approach
was not a plausible reading of the Sentencing Act, and further that Con-
gress would have preferred invalidation of the Act's mandatory provisions
to its total invalidation. Again, this is certainly a conclusion about which,
as the majority acknowledged, "reasonable minds can, and do, differ."9 0
But, accepting arguendo the majority's reading of the Sentencing Act, its
remedial approach of facial invalidation was perfectly legitimate.9 1
88. See id. at *52-*54 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part).
89. Support for this comes from the well-established rule that a court "may impose a
limiting construction on a statute [to render it constitutional] only if it is 'readily
susceptible' to such a construction," see Reno, 521 U.S. at 884 (citation omitted), for, if a
court determines that excising the offending provisions yields the more plausible
interpretation, then the statute is not readily susceptible to an interpretation that simply
narrows the provision's scope of application.
90. Booker, 2005 WL 50108, at *18 (Breyer, J., opinion of the court).
91. The interrelation between statutory construction and facial challenges also arose
in Clark v. Suarez Martinez, a decision handed down the same day as Booker. Clark addressed
the government's powers under the Immigration and Nationality Act's removal provision
to indefinitely detain inadmissible aliens. No. 03-878, 2005 WL 50099 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2005).
Again dissenting, Justice Thomas attacked the majority for imposing the interpretation of
the removal provision previously adopted in regard to admitted aliens on the provision's
application to inadmissible aliens. He emphasized that the Court had adopted this
reading of the removal provision out of concerns about the constitutionality of indefinite
detention of admitted aliens. As a result, he claimed that extending it to inadmissible
aliens amounted to allowing "an end run around black-letter constitutional doctrine
governing facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to statutes: A litigant ordinarily
cannot attack statutes as constitutionally invalid based on constitutional doubts concerning
other litigants or factual circumstances." Id. at *15-*16 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas' criticisms in Clark were mistaken, and stemmed from a failure to
recognize the valid rule requirement (and the concomitant presumption of severability
implicit in the Court's reluctance to allow facial challenges). See supra notes 60-62 and
accompanying text; see also supra note 53 (citing Clark as an example of the valid rule
requirement). As Justice Scalia argued in response, " [the canon] is a tool for choosing
between competing plausible interpretations of ... statutory text"; nothing therefore
precludes a litigant from using the constitutionality of a statute's application to others as a
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II. CONGRESSIONAL POWER PRECEDENT
Given that the availability of facial challenges and severability turns
on substantive constitutional law, the Court's jurisprudence in cases in-
volving claims that Congress exceeded its enumerated powers warrants
careful analysis. While the variation in the Court's Section 5 jurispru-
dence in recent years-both compared with earlier decisions that did not
use the congruence-and-proportionality test and in the application of this
test-might seem to call into question the utility of such an inquiry, im-
portant points nonetheless emerge. One is that the facial cast of recent
Section 5 decisions is misleading, and in fact the Court at present has no
consistent practice regarding whether challenges to Congress' powers are
addressed on a facial or as-applied basis. A second point is the extent to
which, in the recent Section 5 decisions and congressional power chal-
lenges generally, the Court either presumed that ordinary severability
rules apply or, in fact, severed unconstitutional applications of chal-
lenged statutes.
A. Section 5 and Enforcement Power Precedent
1. Recent Section 5 Decisions. - Since City of Boerne v. Flores92 in 1997,
the Court has handed down several decisions on the scope of Congress'
Section 5 powers. Yet until Lane, a majority of the Court had never ex-
pressly addressed the question of whether facial challenges are appropri-
ate in that context. At first inspection, it appears the Court implicitly
treated these recent decisions as Salerno-type facial challenges; the deci-
sions' tone and focus suggest that the Court held the statutes at issue
invalid in all their applications. Indeed, both the majority and dissent in
Lane agreed with this description. 93 On closer review, however, that char-
acterization is difficult to sustain.
Boerne itself is a good example of the seemingly facial character of
these decisions.9 4 There, the Court addressed the constitutionality of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which prohibits federal and
state governments from imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of
religion unless they can demonstrate the burden represents the least re-
strictive means of meeting a compelling government interest.95 The
basis for arguing that the statute be given a particular construction as it applies to her. Clark,
2005 WL 50099, at *6. In so doing, she is simply asserting her own rights to be judged by a
valid rule of law.
92. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
93. See Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1992 n.18, 2005 (2004); see also Sabri v.
United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1948 (2004) (noting that the Court had "recognized the
validity of facial attacks" in suits addressing "legislation under [Section 5] of the
Fourteenth Amendment"); Catherine Carroll, Note, Section Five Overbreadth: The Facial
Approach to Adjudicating Challenges Under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment,
101 Mich. L. Rev. 1026, 1034-44 (2003) (arguing that the Court has repeatedly resolved
the constitutionality of Section 5 litigation on a facial basis).
94. See also Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1948 (identifying Boerne as a facial challenge).
95. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515-16.
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Court held RFRA "exceed[ed] Congress' power," underscoring both the
breadth of RFRA's restrictions on the states and the paucity of evidence
of religious bigotry.96 According to the Court, RFRA's legislative history
made clear that Congress' goal was to statutorily overturn the decision in
Employment Division v. Smith, which held that generally applicable legisla-
tion that only incidentally burdens religion does not offend the Free Ex-
ercise Clause. 9 7 True, suit under RFRA theoretically remains available to
challenge laws directly targeting religion or denying religious groups in-
dividuated assessment, claims that still trigger strict scrutiny under the
Free Exercise Clause. 98 The Court did not expressly address applicability
of RFRA in such situations, and its brief description of the underlying
facts clearly indicates that it did not view the case as an instance of gov-
ernment singling out a religious entity for harsh treatment.99 Hence,
Boerne could be read as only invalidating RFRA as applied to generally
applicable laws, leaving open the question of its constitutionality in in-
stances of intentional religious discrimination. But this reading is at odds
with the Court's reasoning in Boerne, in particular with its focus on the
legislative record and broad scope of RFRA's remedy instead of the spe-
cific facts of the case before it.10 0
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educational Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank10 1 also has a decidedly facial cast. Florida Prepaid considered
whether the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act
(Patent Remedy Act), which abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity for patent infringements, exceeded Congress' Section 5
power. 10 2 According to the majority, a state violates patent holders' due
process rights only when it "provides no remedy, or only inadequate rem-
96. Id. at 511, 530-36.
97. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79, 884-85 (1990).
98. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533,
537 (1993).
99. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511-12. According to Douglas Laycock, counsel for
respondent Archbishop Flores, evidence of selective discriminatory treatment did exist, but
was not included in the record, because the parties agreed to proceed with the case as a
facial challenge to RFRA's constitutionality. See Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City
of Boerne v. Flores, 39 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 743, 782-83 (1997).
100. One reason why the Court may have failed to address the question of whether
intentional discrimination and denial of individualized treatment claims remain available
under RFRA is that RFRA does not add anything to these types of claims. The same
substantive protections would be afforded to individuals asserting these claims under
§ 1983, or as a defense against state enforcement action. Congress itself was more
concerned about providing protection against generally applicable laws that burden
religious exercise, as demonstrated by its enactment of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000)), after Boerne. See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town
of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2004) (discussing the legislative history and
enactment of the RLUIPA).
101. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
102. Id. at 635.
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edies" for intentional or reckless patent infringement.10 3 As a result, in
order to assess whether the Patent Remedy Act was constitutional as ap-
plied to the case at hand, the Court would need to determine whether
Florida's remedies for patent infringement were constitutionally ade-
quate. But although the majority recognized in a footnote that Florida
provided remedies for patent infringement, it never undertook to assess
their adequacy. 10 4 Instead, it emphasized that Congress failed to identify
a "pattern of patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of
constitutional violations,"1 0 5 and had done "nothing to limit the coverage
of the Act to cases involving arguable constitutional violations." 0 6 The
facial thrust of Forida Prepaid is reinforced by Justice Stevens' dissent,
joined by three other Justices, complaining that the majority's opinion
had "nothing to do with the facts of this case."' 0 7 Justice Stevens argued
that the Court should address only whether the Patent Act was constitu-
tional as "applied to willful infringement," because the case emerged out
of such a charge. 10 8 Although the majority never directly responded to
this contention, its statement "that the Patent Remedy Act cannot be sus-
tained under [Section 5]"109 is more in keeping with an across-the-board
assessment of the Act's constitutionality." 0
Nor is the seemingly facial character of these decisions limited to
those invalidating Section 5 legislation. Hibbs, which upheld the family
leave provision of the FMLA, arose out of a suit against a department of
103. Id. at 643-45.
104. Id. at 644 n.9.
105. Id. at 640.
106. Id. at 646.
107. Id. at 654 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 653-54; see also Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 20, at 1356-59 (discussing
Florida Prepaid).
109. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 647; see id. at 630; see also Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S.
Ct. 1978, 2005 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing Court in Florida Prepaid did
not leave open that the Patent Remedy Act might be constitutional as applied to
"intentional, uncompensated patent infringements").
110. A similar facial cast is evident in other recent Section 5 decisions. In considering
Title I of the ADA in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356 (2001), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) in Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), the Court noted that irrational discrimination by
state employers on the basis of age or disability was unconstitutional. But again, the Court
did not examine whether the alleged discrimination in those cases was irrational, nor did it
expressly limit its holdings that the abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity in these
two statutes exceeded Congress' Section 5 power to instances of rational discrimination.
See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360, 366-68; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83-84, 91; see also Lane, 124 S. Ct. at
2005 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that if Court had used an as-applied approach
in Garrett, "Title I might have been upheld 'as applied' to irrational employment
discrimination"). Instead, the Court emphasized other types of remedies available to state
employees subject to age or disability discrimination. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n. 9
(noting remedies of injunctive relief and suits for money damages by the United States still
remained available under Title I); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91-92 (noting most state employees
can recover money damages for age discrimination under state age discrimination
statutes).
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the Nevada state government. Yet the majority nowhere examined Ne-
vada's leave provisions for state employees prior to the FMLA's enact-
ment, even though it described the types of leave available in other
states.1 1 Moreover, writing for himself in dissent, Justice Scalia stated
that unlike instances where legislation is challenged as violating individ-
ual constitutional rights, in congressional power challenges "the court
first asks whether the statute is constitutional on its face," and then assesses
whether the statute is also constitutional as applied if the facial challenge
fails. 1 1 2 The Court did not leave room for such an as-applied challenge,
however, stating "[w] e hold that employees of the State of Nevada may
recover money damages in the event of the State's failure to comply with
the family-care provisions of the [FMLA]." 113
Nonetheless, it would be wrong to view these decisions as clearly es-
tablishing the use of facial challenges in Section 5 litigation.1 14 To begin
with, the Court never expressly addressed that question and thus it never
explained why the ordinary rules disfavoring facial challenges should not
apply here. What the decisions most clearly reveal is the Court's belief
that the state actions targeted by congressional legislation in most of
these cases-imposition of general burdens on religion, patent infringe-
ment, age and disability discrimination-will rarely be unconstitutional.
This lack of sympathy for the underlying constitutional violations leads to
the broad tenor of these decisions; part of the explanation for the Court's
refusal to leave open application of Title I of the ADA to irrational disa-
bility discrimination in Board of Trustees v. Garrett is, no doubt, that it be-
lieved such discrimination will almost always, if not always, be rational. 1 5
In these decisions, the Court was focused on substance and not proce-
dure, and thus discerning a view on the appropriateness of facial chal-
lenges requires some reading between the lines.
111. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 733-34 (2003); see also id.
at 755 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (describing Nevada's leave policies).
112. See id. at 743 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 725 (opinion of the Court).
114. However, Justice Stevens' attempt to distinguish this precedent in Lane is not
particularly persuasive. He argued that "all [the] . . . recent [section] five cases[ ]
concerned legislation that narrowly targeted the enforcement of a single constitutional
right," 124 S. Ct. at 1993 n.18. This characterization of the Court's prior Section 5
jurisprudence elides important distinctions under the rubric of "single constitutional
right." For example, Congress enacted RFRA to enforce individuals' free exercise rights,
but as noted, the scope of the free exercise right varies significantly depending upon
whether the government is simply subjecting religion to generally applicable laws or
instead targeting it for special burdens. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. To
the extent that Boerne's language suggests that RFRA was invalid even with respect to the
latter type of government action, it seems quite irrelevant that the constitutional
protections against intentional religious discrimination and generally applicable legislation
emanate from the same constitutional source.
115. See, e.g., 531 U.S. at 367 (stating it would be rational and thus constitutional for
a state to refuse to make any accommodation for the disabled); see also Kimel, 528 U.S. at
87-88 (concluding "very little" of the conduct prohibited by the ADEA is likely to be
unconstitutional and noting that age can be used as a proxy for other characteristics).
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This is true even of Florida Prepaid and Hibbs, where the dissents'
seeming arguments for an as-applied approach might suggest that the
facial cast of the majority opinions was intended. In fact, however, the
dissents' arguments are less supportive of an as-applied approach than
they might at first appear. In particular, underlying Justice Scalia's view
in Hibbs that Nevada must retain the ability to raise an as-applied chal-
lenge is his solitary belief-reiterated in Lane-that a state could not be
subjected to the FMLA absent evidence that particular state engaged in
discrimination. 1 6 It was this substantive constitutional rule that the ma-
jority rejected, holding that a pattern of gender discrimination by states
generally was sufficient to justify subjecting a particular state, Nevada, to
the Act.1 7 While Justice Stevens' comments in Florida Prepaid are more
procedural in focus, it is notable that he did not suggest that the Court
limit itself to assessing whether the Patent Remedy Act was constitutional
in regard to willful patent infringements by Florida alone, but rather will-
ful infringements generally. As a result, even on Justice Stevens' terms,
the challenge to the Patent Remedy Act went beyond the factual situation
of the case at hand. Again, this is also true of Lane. Although the major-
ity there refused to consider the constitutionality of Title II as applied to
constitutional rights other than access to the courts, it did not limit itself
to assessing the constitutionality of Title II as applied to the situations of
the two plaintiffs in the case; indeed, it never seriously assessed whether
their rights of access to the courts were actually violated. 118
In sum, in all these decisions-Lane, Hibbs, and Florida Prepaid in-
cluded-both the majority and the dissents agree that assessing the con-
stitutionality of Section 5 legislation requires going beyond the specifics
of the case before the Court. The reason for this agreement is not diffi-
cult to discern. If the constitutionality of a Section 5 statute turns on
116. See 538 U.S. at 741-42 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) ("The constitutional violation that
is a prerequisite to 'prophylactic' congressional action to 'enforce' the Fourteenth
Amendment is a violation by the State against which the enforcement action is taken.
There is no guilt by association .. " (emphasis omitted)); see also Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2010,
2012-13 (rejecting claim that Section 5 authorizes prophylactic legislation except to
remedy racial discrimination, and even in cases of racial discrimination requiring an
"identified history of relevant constitutional violations" before such legislation can be
applied to a state). Moreover, Justice Scalia's Hibbs dissent makes clear that he believes the
constitutionality of Section 5 legislation should first be assessed facially. See 538 U.S. at
743.
117. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 727-28 ("Congress' power 'to enforce' the Amendment
includes the authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights .... In other words,
Congress may enact so-called prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially constitutional
conduct, in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
118. See 124 S. Ct. at 1988 (noting in passing only that right of access to the court
grants "a criminal defendant such as respondent Lane the right to be present at all stages
of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 2000 n.4 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (providing
brief argument as to why no rights of access to the court were violated in the case before
the Court).
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whether a pattern of unconstitutional action exists in the states as a
whole, then the Court must necessarily look beyond the actions of the
state in the case before it in assessing the claim that the statute exceeds
Congress' powers. Hence again, the facial tone of these decisions is really
a reflection of their substantive analysis, rather than a position on
whether the Court should assess the constitutionality of a challenged stat-
ute based on all its possible applications. Put differently, these decisions
are "facial" in the sense that each addresses challenges to a general rule,
that rule being the requirements of the targeted legislation. But this fa-
cial character says nothing about how broadly the Court must assess the
constitutionality of that general rule.
A second reason why these decisions are less supportive of a facial
approach than they initially appear concerns severability. The Court's
failure to sever potentially constitutional applications of the challenged
Section 5 statutes might seem to signal a departure from ordinary sever-
ability rules and the presumption of severability. In fact, however, the
Court routinely presumed severability in these cases. This is clearest in
Garrett, where the Court stated it was only addressing the constitutionality
of Title I, and not other parts of the ADA.119 More importantly, Garrett
(like many of these decisions) addressed only the constitutionality of
making the states liable for money damages in private suits; the Court
stressed that the duties imposed by Title I remained binding and could
be enforced by other means, such as injunctive suits or suits for money
damages brought by the United States. 120 Plainly, therefore, Garrett im-
plicitly ruled the private suit remedy severable from Title I's substantive
duties. Dissenting in Hibbs, Justice Kennedy advocated a similar interpre-
tation of the FMLA. 121
Another example arises from subsequent judicial responses to
Boerne. Boerne's language and analysis appear in keeping with a Salerno-
style approach holding the statute invalid in all its applications. Notably,
however, several federal appellate courts have since upheld RFRA's sub-
stantive requirements as applied to federal law or the federal government
and territories, even though invalid as applied to the states.1 22 On the
119. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 n.1 (refusing to address the constitutionality of Title
II of the ADA); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 n.5 (2000) (noting
that the federal appellate courts had uniformly upheld the constitutionality of a separate
provision of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) that made it a federal crime to
travel across state lines "with the intent to injure, harass, or intimidate that person's spouse
or intimate partner" and thereby cause the spouse or partner bodily injury).
120. 531 U.S. at 374 n.9.
121. See 538 U.S. at 759 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that the FMLA is "likely a
valid exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause, and so the standards it
prescribes will be binding upon the States" and enforceable by private suits for injunctive
relief or suits by the United States for money damages (citations omitted)).
122. See, e.g., Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 958-59 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding
RFRA constitutional as applied to federal government); Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph
Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 831-33 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding RFRA constitutional as applied to
federal law); In re Young, 141 F.3d 854, 858-61 (8th Cir. 1998) (same).
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one hand, these rulings might appear perfectly unexceptional; after all,
the federal government relies on its Article I and other powers, not the
Section 5 enforcement power, in regulating the reach of federal law. Yet
the substantive duties RFRA imposed on state and federal governments
came in the same statutory provision, and thus courts must find the provi-
sion's reference to state governments severable in order to find the provi-
sion can still be applied to the federal government. 12 3 Absent such sever-
ability, the provision's unconstitutionality in regard to state governments
would render it completely unenforceable.
In Lane, Chief Justice Rehnquist seemingly sought to rebut the
Court's use of severability in other Section 5 decisions by characterizing
Title II as an "undifferentiated" statute that "applies indiscriminately to
all services, programs, or activities of any public entity."1 2 4 The thrust of
this characterization is unclear, however. His point might be that, unlike
the other Section 5 legislation the Court considered, in the case of Title
II no separate statutory text existed that the Court could sever; instead,
here the Court was resorting to severing applications of a single statutory
provision. But as discussed earlier, differentiating between text and ap-
plication severability in this fashion is not supported by logic or case
law.1 25 A second way of understanding the ChiefJustice's point is simply
as the claim that Title II is not readily susceptible to having its different
applications severed from one another. Perhaps so; it is certainly true
that the majority offers no justification for its contrary premise that Title
II can be construed in this fashion, and reference to severing applications
is notably absent from the ADA's severability clause. 126 In failing to offer
such a justification, however, the Lane majority has substantial preceden-
tial company; in fact, the Court only infrequently addresses severability
unless it finds a particular provision or application unconstitutional. 12 7
Moreover, given the presumption of severability that lies behind the
Court's professed practice of addressing constitutional challenges on an
as-applied basis, the onus would appear to lie on the ChiefJustice to pro-
vide greater justification than simply characterizing Title II as "undiffer-
entiated" to explain why the majority erred in its construction of the stat-
ute. Regardless, even if the different applications of Title II should not
123. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1997) (quoting statutory
provision that states RFRA "applies to all federal and state law"); Kikumura, 242 F.3d at
959-60 (holding unconstitutional application of RFRA to the states is severable); Young,
141 F.3d at 858-59 (same). Congress has amended RFRA to only apply to federal law. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3a (2000).
124. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 2005 (2004) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 51-57.
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 12213 ("Should any provision in this chapter be found to be
unconstitutional by a court of law, such provision shall be severed from the remainder of
the chapter, and such action shall not affect the enforceability of the remaining provisions
of the chapter.").
127. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 55-56.
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be construed as severable, this would not justify applying a presumption
against severability in other Section 5 challenges.
2. Previous Enforcement Power Decisions. - Moving beyond the Court's
recent Section 5 precedent, it is worth asking whether -arlier enforce-
ment power decisions offer useful guidance. Once again, it is hard to
discern a clear practice. Notably, however, these earlier decisions are
more as-applied in tone, and the Court even more regularly engaged in
severability.
A good example is United States v. Raines,128 a decision relied on by
Justice Stevens in Lane. In Raines, the government sought to enjoin Geor-
gia voting officials from preventing blacks from registering to vote.1 29
The Civil Rights Act of 1957, enacted pursuant to the Fifteenth Amend-
ment's enforcement power, authorized the Attorney General to institute
an action "[w]henever any person has engaged or there are reasonable
grounds to believe that any person is about to engage" in acts that would
deprive the right to vote based on race. 13 0 The district court had dis-
missed the government's action on the ground that "the statute on its
face was susceptible of [unconstitutional] application," namely applica-
tion to private individuals, and thus should be "considered unconstitu-
tional in all its applications." 13 1 The Supreme Court reversed. According
to the Court, "if the complaint here called for an application of the stat-
ute clearly constitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment, that should
have been an end to the question of constitutionality."'132 Raines is not
alone in expressly limiting its assessment of enforcement power legisla-
tion to a particular context; in Katzenbach v. Morgan the Court considered
a challenge to section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that attacked
128. 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
129. Id. at 19.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c).
131. Raines, 362 U.S. at 20. The district court's approach was not without
precedential support. In particular, in United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875), the
Court ruled that Congress' Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power authorized only
federal legislation imposing criminal penalties on elections officials for refusing to accept
the votes of qualified electors on account of race or color. As the statute before it
contained no such state action limitation, the Court ruled it could not be enforced-even
when the conduct of state elections officials was challenged precisely on this basis. See id.
at 218-22; id. at 241-42 (Harlan,J., dissenting) (noting that the defendant was prosecuted
for denying the right to vote on account of race); see also James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127,
136, 139-40 (1903) (refusing to apply a federal statute prohibiting the use of bribery to
deny a qualified voter the right to vote on account of race in a case alleging bribery in
federal elections). Given the Supreme Court's decision in Raines, however, Reese offers
little support for deviating from ordinary severability rules in the enforcement power
context today. See Raines, 362 U.S. at 24 (suggesting Reese may have rested on fair warning
concerns but adding "to the extent Reese did depend on an approach inconsistent with
what we think the better one ... we cannot follow it here"); see also Stern, supra note 47,
at 94-106 (criticizing Reese and arguing that the Court deviated from its approach in
subsequent decisions).
132. Raines, 362 U.S. at 24-25.
2005]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
the section only insofar as it would enable New York residents who were
educated in Puerto Rico to vote.1 33
Interestingly, despite its contemporary assignment to the as-applied
camp, Raines actually represents an instance where the Court entertained
a facial challenge in the traditional sense. Although the Court refused to
consider the constitutionality of the 1957 Act as applied to private individ-
uals, it upheld the statute's application to all state officers acting within
the course of their official duties, not just to the case at hand. In other
words, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a general rule it found
embodied in the statute laid down by Congress: specifically, a prohibi-
tion on state officials depriving individuals of the right to vote based on
race.1 34 What the Court rejected was simply the claim that it had to ad-
dress all possible applications before it could pronounce on the statute's
constitutionality. According to the Court, this claim was at odds with its
usual rules of practice which preclude individuals from challenging a stat-
ute's application to others except in a few narrow contexts, which in-
cluded "that rarest of cases" where the Court concludes a statute is insep-
arable.' 35 Implicit in the Court's decision is its view that the fact that
Congress' enforcement power was involved did not suffice to justify a
deviation from these rules or a special presumption of nonseverability. t 36
Other earlier enforcement power decisions initially appear more fa-
cial in nature, but like the recent Section 5 decisions, on closer inspec-
tion their facial character becomes more questionable. Two decisions
worth noting in this regard are the Civil Rights Casest 37 and South Carolina
v. Katzenbach.' 3 8 The Civil Rights Cases invalidated the Civil Rights Act of
1875's prohibition on racial discrimination in places of public accommo-
133. 384 U.S. 641, 644-45 (1966). Section 4(e) prohibits denying any person who has
successfully completed sixth grade in a school accredited by any state, territory, the District
of Columbia, or Puerto Rico the right to vote based on ability to read English. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b(e). The Court justified its decision to consider the challenge only on this limited
basis on the ground that section 4(e) was adopted with "the explicit purpose of dealing
with the disenfranchisement of large segments of the Puerto Rican population in New
York" and with the understanding that "in all probability the practical effect of [the
section] will be limited to enfranchising those educated in Puerto Rican schools." See
Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 645 n.3.
134. See Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1948 (2004); Raines, 362 U.S. at 25.
The same is true of Katzenbach; although the Court there made references to
discrimination against Puerto Ricans in voting and provision of services, suggesting a
traditional as-applied challenge, it never demanded any showing that such discrimination
actually existed in New York. 384 U.S. at 652-55.
135. Raines, 362 U.S. at 23.
136. See id. at 22-24; see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104 (1971) (stating
in challenge to enforcement power legislation that the "Court has long since firmly
rejected" earlier use of "a severability rule that required invalidation of an entire statute if
any part of it w-as unconstitutionally overbroad, unless its different parts could be read as
wholly independent provisions").
137. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
138. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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dation. 1 39 In so ruling the Court underscored that the Act was not lim-
ited to states that had violated Fourteenth Amendment rights, 140 and did
not undertake a detailed inquiry into whether the states where the cases
before it arose-New York, Tennessee, and California-fell into the inno-
cent state category.' 4 ' Yet the Court also stated that "[i]nnkeepers and
public carriers, by the laws of all the States, so far as we are aware, are
bound, to the extent of their facilities, to furnish proper accommodation
to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith apply for them"' 42-
language that could be read as a rejection of the claim that the laws spe-
cifically challenged in the case sanctioned discrimination in accommoda-
tions. So understood, this language suggests that the Court did not hold
the 1875 Act facially invalid and it remained applicable in the context of
overfly discriminatory state laws.1 43
South Carolina displays similar ambiguities. Although the Court there
referred to evidence specific to South Carolina in upholding several chal-
139. 109 U.S. at 26.
140. See id. at 14 ("It applies equally to cases arising in States which have the justest
laws respecting the personal rights of citizens, and whose authorities are ever ready to
enforce such laws as to those which arise in States that may have violated the prohibition of
the amendment.").
141. See id. at 8-19. In this regard, the decision in the Civil Rights Cases stands in
contrast to United States v. Guest, where the Court upheld federal indictments against
private individuals for conspiracy to deny blacks access to places of public accommodation
on the grounds that the indictments alleged sufficient state involvement to qualify as
targeting state action. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755-57 (1966); see also id.
at 761-62 (Clark, J., concurring). Significantly, however, the Court in Guest disagreed on
whether the federal statute in question applied to private action, and the Court's emphasis
on the specific facts alleged in the indictment was as much a response to statutory authority
concerns as to concerns about whether, if read to encompass private action, the statute was
constitutional. Compare id. at 755 (opinion of the Court) (reading statute as simply
replicating "bare terms of the Equal Protection Clause"), with id. at 761-62 (Clark, J.,
concurring) (not addressing statutory question but stating Congress can reach private
action), with id. at 777-84 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (reading statute as
covering private action and arguing that the statute as so read was constitutional).
142. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25.
143. Making sense of the Court's statement is difficult for several reasons, not least
because whatever was stated on the face of state laws, their administration was decidedly
unequal, and addressing such discriminatory state administration was a main concern of
the 1875 Act. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 624-25 (2000) (citing legislative
history to show that enacting Congress intended Civil Rights Act of 1875 to target facially
neutral state laws administered with discrimination against newly free slaves). Another
interpretation is that the Court was simply affirming Congress' power to address state
discrimination when it occurs through appropriately targeted legislation, not that it was
suggesting that the 1875 Act could be constitutionally applied. This interpretation may
accord better with the Court's earlier conclusion that Congress may only target state action
using its Fourteenth Amendment power. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 10-12,
13-14. On the other hand, reading the quoted language as implying that the Act could be
constitutionally applied where the law was overtly discriminatory comports with the
opinion's next sentence, affirming that "[i]f the laws themselves make any unjust
discrimination . . . Congress has full power to afford a remedy under [the Fourteenth
Amendment] and in accordance with it." Id. at 25.
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lenged provisions of the 1965 Voting Rights Act as valid exercises of Con-
gress' Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power, it plainly did not limit
its inquiry into the provisions' constitutional application to that state.1 4 4
More importantly, many of the challenged provisions applied only to cer-
tain jurisdictions and applied identically to all the jurisdictions so cov-
ered, including South Carolina. Thus, by deciding the constitutionality
of the Act as applied to South Carolina, the Court necessarily also ad-
dressed its constitutionality vis-A-vis the other covered jurisdictions. Rec-
ognizing this fact, the Court invited other states to participate, and nu-
merous states submitted amicus briefs and participated in oral
argument. 145 As a result, the case was really akin to a nationwide class
action, in that nearly all of those states to which the statute applied were
before the Court. 146
Most significantly, however, even where the Court appeared to ana-
lyze challenges to enforcement legislation on a facial basis, it generally
presumed the severability of any unconstitutional portions. Once again
the Civil Rights Cases provides an example: The Court there reaffirmed
Ex parte Virginia,1 4 7 an earlier decision where it had upheld a separate
section of the Act as constitutional, thereby presuming that the Act's dif-
ferent sections were severable.1 48 So too, in South Carolina the Court em-
phasized that it was not considering the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act in its entirety, specifically relying on Raines in refusing to ad-
dress the Act's criminal provisions.1 49 In yet another decision, Oregon v.
Mitchell, the Court similarly severed parts of a statute it deemed outside of
Congress' powers rather than invalidating the statute in toto. °5 0 While
these are all instances of text severability, in Raines the Court expressly
refused to limit severability to that context, instead holding that the dis-
144. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310-15 (1966) (discussing
evidence of racial discrimination from South Carolina and other Southern states); id. at
327-30 (upholding application of coverage formula to five Southern states in addition to
South Carolina).
145. See id. at 307-08.
146. It is also hard to generalize from the procedures used in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach because it was a unique decision. Given the momentous nature of the question
of the Voting Rights Act's constitutionality and the need for a speedy decision, the Court
took the case in its original jurisdiction, but without even referring it to a special master for
development of a factual record. See id. at 307; Alexander M. Bickel, The Voting Rights
Cases, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 79, 80-93 (discussing how South Carolina v. Katzenbach reached
the Supreme Court and effect of the grant of original jurisdiction on Court's analysis).
147. 100 U.S. 339, 349 (1879).
148. 109 U.S. at 15-16.
149. See 383 U.S. at 316-17 (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20-24
(1960)).
150. 400 U.S. 112, 117-18, 130-31 (1970) (BlackJ., announcing thejudgment of the
Court in an opinion expressing his own view of the cases) (arguing that constitutional
parts of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 could be severed from
unconstitutional provision lowering voting age to 18 for state and local elections).
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trict court had erred in considering the constitutionality of statutory ap-
plications not actually before it. 15 1
At a minimum, therefore, Raines and these earlier enforcement
power decisions provide some precedential support for applying the ordi-
nary presumption of severability in Section 5 cases. In Lane, ChiefJustice
Rehnquist attempted to deny that any such support existed. He argued
that because application of the statute to state officials in Raines was
clearly constitutional, Raines said nothing about how the Court should
proceed when the constitutionality of applying enforcement legislation to
the state is at issue. 152 This is unpersuasive, given that the Court upheld
Title II's constitutionality as applied to state programs and services involv-
ing the right of access to the courts, making Raines directly analogous.
The Chief Justice also suggested that Raines was irrelevant because it was
decided "before [the Court] enunciated the congruence-and-proportion-
ality test."153 True enough, but this point simply presumes the answer to
the very question confronting the Court: Does the congruence-and-pro-
portionality standard, a test governing the substantive validity of Section 5
legislation, also generate an approach regarding facial challenges and
severability different from that which otherwise generally obtains?
B. Commerce and Spending Clause Precedent
Confusion regarding the appropriateness of facial challenges is also
evident in the Court's decisions addressing attacks on legislation as ex-
ceeding Congress' Article I powers. Interestingly, the Court's Commerce
Clause decisions display far more consistency than its enforcement power
decisions, with facial challenges being routinely entertained. Consistency
is also apparent regarding Spending Clause challenges, but here the pat-
tern is for the Court to insist that challenges be brought on an as-applied
basis. The obvious question that results is how to explain the Court's
differential practice regarding these two forms of Article I challenges.
The Court's willingness to entertain facial challenges holds true for
both its earlier and more recent commerce power decisions. The Court's
acceptance of facial challenges was closely related to the substantive stan-
dard it applied in judging the constitutionality of commerce-power legis-
lation in its post-New Deal decisions. Demonstrating that a particular ac-
tivity did not itself affect interstate commerce was insufficient to show that
it was outside of Congress' regulatory purview. Instead, Congress' power
to regulate economic conduct was measured on an aggregate basis: The
key inquiry was whether the class of activities of which a particular in-
stance was part had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 154 This
class-of-activities analysis meant that to bring a successful as-applied attack
151. See 362 U.S. at 23-25.
152. See Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 2005 n.11 (2004).
153. Id. at 2005.
154. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151-56 (1971); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 125 (1942); see also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301 (1964) (holding
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a challenger would have to demonstrate, as the Carolene Products Court
put it, that "the article [regulated], although within the prohibited class,
is so different from others of the class as to be without the reason for the
prohibition."1 5 5 Given the extremely deferential review used in assessing
commerce power legislation's rationality, however, succeeding on such
an as-applied claim was in practice impossible. 15 6
Of course, this deferential standard of review meant that facial chal-
lenges to commerce power legislation had equally little chance of success,
and thus judicial willingness to entertain such challenges was of no mo-
ment. When the Court applied a more rigorous and formalistic analysis
that limited Congress' scope of power-as it did in its early New Deal
decisions-acceptance of facial challenges carried far more significance.
It is worth noting that the Court's practice regarding facial challenges in
the early New Deal period was more varied. Some facial invalidations
occurred, 15 7 but in other decisions the Court simply held particular statu-
tory applications in excess of the commerce power.'5 8 This variation
seems best explained, however, as resulting from differences in statutory
text, with facial challenges being largely the norm. 159
Congress can regulate based on total incidence of racial discrimination on interstate
commerce).
155. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938).
156. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62
(1964); Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125, 128-29; Carotene Prods., 304 U.S. at 154.
157. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 307-10 (1936) (holding that
labor provisions of Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 regulate production and fall
outside of the commerce power); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 362-74
(1935) (invalidating statute mandating retirement and pension plan for employees of
interstate carriers as not a regulation of interstate commerce); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251, 276-77 (1918) (invalidating statute excluding products of child labor from
interstate commerce).
158. In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, for instance, the Court treated a
Commerce Clause challenge to the Live Poultry Code, adopted pursuant to section 3 of
the National Industrial Recovery Act, on an as-applied basis, emphasizing that the
violations of the Code with which the defendants had been charged did not involve
interstate commerce. See 295 U.S. 495, 542-48 (1935) (concluding that "[s]o far as the
poultry here in question is concerned, the flow of interstate commerce had ceased" and
that defendants' violations of wage and hour provisions had only an indirect effect on
interstate commerce); see also United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1895)
(invalidating application of the Sherman Act to acquisition of monopoly on manufacture
of refined sugar).
159. For example, part of the reason the Schechter Court treated the challenge on an
as-applied basis was that penalties were only imposed under the Act for violations of a Code
provision regarding a transaction in or affecting interstate commerce. See 295 U.S. at 542.
The oddity of Schechter is that the Court considered the as-applied Commerce Clause
challenge at all given that it had already held that the codemaking authority of section 3
represented an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, see id. at 541-42, which
would appear to facially invalidate section 3.
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The class-of-activities inquiry remains the Court's approach today, at
least where economic activity is involved. 160 However, the Court's recent
commerce power decisions, United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morri-
son, suggest some return to a more formalistic analysis of the reach of
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, insofar as the deci-
sions insist on a judicially imposed distinction between economic and
noneconomic activity.1 61 More to the point here, these decisions quite
clearly continue the Court's willingness to entertain facial challenges to
the constitutionality of commerce power legislation. Indeed, they pro-
vide the strongest contemporary support for the use of facial challenges
to invalidate federal statutes as exceeding congressional power.
At issue in Lopez was the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act (School Zones Act), which made knowing possession of a gun
in a school zone a federal offense. Morrison addressed the constitutional-
ity of the private civil remedy provision of the federal Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA). In both decisions, the Court focused on the nature
of the class of activities being regulated-gun possession near a school in
Lopez, gender-motivated violence in Morrison162-as well as other facial
characteristics of the challenged legislation, specifically the absence of a
jurisdictional element that "would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry,
that the [act] in question affects interstate commerce."1 63 Moreover, in
both the Court concluded that the challenged provisions could not be
sustained under the commerce power, indicating that they were invalid in
their entirety and thus not available even when specific facts could be
alleged demonstrating sufficient connection to interstate commerce.1 64
The only reference to underlying facts in the two decisions came at the
end of Lopez, where the Court stated in passing that "[r]espondent was a
local student at a local school; there is no indication that he had recently
moved in interstate commerce. ' 165 While this language alone might sug-
gest that conviction under the School Zones Act could be sustained when
160. See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56-57 (2003) ("Congress'
Commerce Clause power 'may be exercised in individual cases without showing any
specific effect upon interstate commerce' if in the aggregate the economic activity in
question would represent 'a general practice . . . subject to federal control.'" (quoting
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948))).
161. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-13, 617-18 (2000); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-61 (1995); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 638-45 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (characterizing Lopez and Morrison as embodying a formalistic analysis akin
to that used from the onset of national commercial legislation in late 1880s to the early
New Deal).
162. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
163. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 ("[Section] 13981
contains no jurisdictional element establishing that the federal cause of action is in
pursuance of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce.").
164. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565-66; see also Morrison, 529
U.S. at 607 ("[W]e invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that
Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds.").
165. 514 U.S. at 567.
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the evidence in a particular case demonstrated an interstate commerce
connection, such a reading fits poorly with the rest of the opinion's em-
phasis on statutory text.1 66
On the Spending Clause front, the Court's approach is noticeably
different, as evidenced by the Court's Sabri decision last Term. Sabri in-
volved a challenge to the constitutionality of a federal statute criminaliz-
ing bribery of state, local, and tribal officials of entities that receive at
least $10,000 in federal funds. The defendant in Sabri argued that the
federal bribery statute was facially flawed because it did not require proof
of a connection between the federal funds and the alleged bribe. The
Court rejected this argument out of hand, stating that "[w]e simply do
not presume the unconstitutionality of federal criminal statutes lacking
explicit provision of ajurisdictional hook" and that the $10,000 threshold
meant no reason existed to suspect the statute would extend beyond the
scope of legitimate federal interests. 167 Although the Court in fact enter-
tained Sabri's facial challenge, rejecting it rather summarily on the mer-
its, the Court used the decision as an occasion to disavow such challenges
to spending legislation. According to the Court, Sabri's facial challenge
was particularly inappropriate because "the acts charged against Sabri
himself were well within the limits of legitimate congressional concern,"
meaning that any facial challenge he brought would have to be of the
overbreadth variety, attacking application of the statute to others as un-
constitutional.1 68 "Facial challenges of this sort are especially to be dis-
couraged" and limited to "relatively few settings." 169
Sabri is unusual in providing an express discussion of the appropri-
ateness of facial challenges, but it does not stand alone in discouraging
such challenges in the spending context. In a prior decision, Salinas v.
United States, the Court similarly rejected a facial challenge to the bribery
statute on the grounds that there was "no serious doubt about [its] consti-
166. See, e.g., id. at 561 ("Section 9 22(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has
nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise . . . ."); id. at 567
("[T]here is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to
interstate commerce."). Interestingly, in its decision below, the Fifth Circuit expressly
refused to address whether the challenged section of the School Zones Act could ever be
constitutionally applied based on proof of an interstate connection, holding that Lopez's
conviction still had to be reversed as the indictment failed to allege an interstate commerce
nexus as part of the offense. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1368 (5th Cir. 1993).
Congress appears to have read Lopez as facially invalidating the Act as it then stood, and
subsequently amended the Act to include an express jurisdictional element. See Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. 104-208, § 657, 110 Star. 3009, 3009-370
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2) (a) (2000)).
167. Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1945-46 (2004).
168. Id. at 1948. Sabri was charged with bribing a city council member who also sat
on the board of commissioners overseeing the Minneapolis Community Agency's budget;
the City of Minneapolis and the agency received $28.8 million and $23 million in federal
funds, respectively, in the year in which the bribery occurred. See United States v. Sabri,
326 F.3d 937, 939 (8th Cir. 2003).
169. See 124 S. Ct. at 1948-49.
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tutionality . . . as applied to the facts of [the] case."'170 South Dakota v.
Dole,1 7 1 where the Court set out its current standard for the constitution-
ality of conditional federal spending legislation, is harder to categorize.
The decision proceeds in largely general terms, without much reference
to South Dakota's particular situation. But this omission seems explained
by the fact that the legislation treated all states the same, so that no mean-
ingful distinction could exist between a facial and an as-applied chal-
lenge. To be sure, the Court has entertained and occasionally upheld
facial challenges to Spending Clause legislation.' 72 But as Sabri demon-
strates, it appears much less receptive to such challenges in spending
power cases than in commerce power cases. Little objection was raised to
Sabri's express disavowal of facial overbreadth challenges, and the mild
comment made by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, simply noted
that the Court was not calling into question the approach it had followed
in Lopez and Morrison.173
Why this different receptivity to facial challenges in the Spending
and Commerce Clause contexts? The Court's sparse discussion in Sabri
provides no clarification. One answer might be that the Court has not
given much thought to the question and failed to recognize that its prac-
tice regarding these two Article I powers and facial challenges is inconsis-
tent. However, given the majority's discussion of the appropriateness of
facial challenges in Sabi-combined with the concurrence's distinction
of Lopez and Morrison-ignorance of the inconsistency seems implausible.
More likely, the Court's lack of explanation reflects the fact that it is more
confident about its approach in the two separate contexts than about how
to reconcile the variation between them.
One way of trying to reconcile the decisions focuses on the fact that
the federal bribery statute at issue in Sabri and Salinas required proof of a
threshold amount of federal funds, thereby supplying the jurisdictional
element that the Court found lacking in Lopez and Morrison. As a practi-
cal matter, the presence of the threshold triggering amount may explain
the Court's greater willingness in Sabri and Salinas to rely on a case-by-
case inquiry to guard against congressional overreaching; it seems espe-
cially likely that Lopez would have come out differently had the School
Zones Act included ajurisdictional element.' 74 But this explanation can-
170. 522 U.S. 52, 60-61 (1997).
171. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
172. See, e.g., Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585-93 (1937) (upholding
unemployment compensation provisions of the Social Security Act as not exceeding the
spending power); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 77-78 (1936) (invalidating
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 as exceeding Congress' spending power because it
invaded an area left for state regulation and was inherently coercive).
173. See 124 S. Ct. at 1949 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
174. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567, 561-62 (1995) (emphasizing that
statute did not require showing of a connection to interstate commerce); see also Jones v.
United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857-59 (2000) (construing federal arson statute, which
includes ajurisdictional element, to cover "only property currently used in commerce or in
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not be easily squared with what the Court actually says in these decisions,
in particular Sabri's bald statement that "[w] e can readily dispose of th [eI
position that, to qualify as a valid exercise of Article I power, the statute
must require proof of connection with federal money as an element of
the offense. '175
An alternative explanation rests the difference in approach to facial
challenges on the difference in substantive law applied in each context.
Lopez and Morrison indicate that certain activities lie outside of Congress'
commerce power: "[T]he Constitution's enumeration of pow-
ers . , . presuppose [s] something not enumerated."176 This explains why
in the Commerce Clause context the focus of analysis is usually on the
class of activities that Congress sought to regulate and on whether these
activities are economic or noneconomic in nature, 1 7 7 a focus that almost
always forces the Court to adopt an analysis that goes beyond the facts of
the case before it. t 7 8 Raich v. Ashcroft, 179 a Ninth Circuit decision that the
Supreme Court is reviewing this Term, demonstrates this phenomenon.
Raich enjoined application of the federal Controlled Substances Act to
individuals who cultivated and possessed marijuana for personal medical
use, pursuant to a physician's advice. But the Ninth Circuit did not base
its ruling on a determination that the activities of plaintiffs per se had a
de minimis impact on interstate commerce; to the contrary, it noted that
"'[w] here the class of activities ... regulated . . . is within the reach of
federal power, the courts have no power to excise, as trivial, individual
instances of the class.' "180 Instead, the appeals court held that such culti-
vation and use of marijuana represented a distinct class of activity that was
noneconomic in nature and lacked sufficient connection to interstate
commerce to bring it within Congress' commerce power.' 8 '
Under the Court's Spending Clause analysis, by contrast, Congress is
not limited in the type of activities it can target: "[O]bjectives not
an activity affecting commerce" to avoid constitutional concerns); United States v. Danks,
221 F.3d 1037, 1038-39 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (upholding constitutionality of
prohibition on possession of a firearm in a school zone amended to include ajurisdictional
element). Although Morrison also emphasizes the importance of a jurisdictional element,
see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000), it is hard to imagine how a
jurisdictional element could be added to VAWA's private civil suit remedy without
significantly curtailing its scope.
175. See 124 S. Ct. at 1945.
176. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (paraphrasing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
195 (1824)); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18 ("The Constitution requires a distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local.").
177. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-09, 613.
178. Congress has the power to enact legislation targeting a class of one, but such
situations are quite rare. For an example, see Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,
468-73 (1977) (upholding federal statute regulating only disposition of Nixon's papers
against charge it unconstitutionally singled out the former President).
179. 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2909 (2004).
180. Id. at 1228 (emphasis and citations omitted).
181. Id. at 1228-31.
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thought to be within Article I's 'enumerated legislative fields' . . . may
nevertheless be attained through use of the spending power." 182 The
protection against congressional overreaching in spending lies not in ju-
dicially enforced subject matter constraints, but rather in the states' abil-
ity to reject funds combined with a clear statement requirement. 183 In-
deed, given the loose relation to federal interests and high financial
penalties the Court accepted in Dole and Sabri,184 a state's only potentially
viable option for arguing that these restrictions are not met is an as-ap-
plied challenge that bases claims of lack of connection to federal interests
and coercion on the state's peculiar situation. Spending power chal-
lenges are thus substantively ill suited to facial treatment.
In any event, the Court's differing receptivity to facial challenges
should not obscure a point of constancy in its recent commerce and
spending power jurisprudence: In both, the Court appears to apply ordi-
nary rules of severability. 18 5 The question of severability arose only im-
plicitly in Morrison, when the Court cited a separate criminal provision of
VAWA that contained a jurisdictional element as an example of legisla-
tion that was sufficiently tied to interstate commerce. 186 Although not
discussing the question, the Court's comment that the federal appellate
courts had uniformly upheld this provision suggests that it believed that
the unconstitutional parts of the VAWA could be severed and would not
force invalidation of the statute as a whole.1 87 Several recent appellate
court decisions similarly presume severability by invalidating particular
182. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citations omitted).
183. On the clear statement requirement, see Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 ("[I]f Congress
desires to condition the States' receipt of federal funds, it 'must do so unambiguously
.... '(quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981))). On
states' power to decline, see id. at 211 ("'[T]o hold that motive or temptation is equivalent
to coercion is to plunge the law in endless difficulties.... Till now the law has been guided
by a robust common sense which assumes the freedom of the will as a working
hypothesis.'" (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937))); see also
Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947) (arguing state could adopt
"the 'simple expedient' of not yielding to what she urges is federal coercion"). While the
general welfare requirement might seem to impose a class-of-activities restriction on the
spending power, this requirement is essentially left for legislative determination. See Dole,
483 U.S. at 207; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976).
184. See Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1946 (2004); Dole, 483 U.S. at 208-11.
185. In its early New Deal decisions, the Court at points seemed less willing to find
severability. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 312-16 (1936) (holding that
price-fixing and labor provisions of the Coal Act were inseparable, notwithstanding a
severability clause); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 361-62 (1935); see also
Stern, supra note 47, at 110-14 (critiquing Carter's approach as stemming from the
Justices' substantive views regarding the legislation in question).
186. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 & n.5 (2000) (describing 18
U.S.C. § 2261 (a) (1) (2000), which made it a crime to "travel[ ] across a State line ... with
the intent to injure, harass, or intimidate that person's spouse or intimate partner, and
who . . . thereby causes bodily injury to such spouse or intimate partner").
187. See id. The Court has also made clear that it will construe federal legislation and
regulations to conform to commerce power limits. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 529
U.S. 848, 857-59 (2000).
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applications of commerce power statutes while refusing to assess the stat-
utes' constitutionality more broadly.1 88 Severability is also presumed in
spending power contexts. Sabri's argument against facial challenges in
spending power cases, for example, carries with it the implication that
any unconstitutional applications of spending legislation could be sev-
ered, since otherwise a successful as-applied challenge would be indistin-
guishable from a facial overbreadth challenge.
Further support for the Court's adhesion to ordinary severability
rules in the Article I context comes from its decision in New York v. United
States.189 There, having found that Congress unconstitutionally comman-
deered state legislatures by requiring them to take title to low-level nu-
clear waste within their borders or face damage liability, the Court ex-
pressly held the take-title provision was severable. In so ruling, the Court
invoked standard severability analysis and emphasized that invalid provi-
sions should be deemed severable absent evidence to the contrary.1 90 As
the New York Court derived its anticommandeering rule from federalism
concerns, the decision is instructive for how the Court approaches sever-
ability in similarly federalism-based commerce and spending power
challenges.
The Court's congressional power precedent thus provides little sup-
port for application of a nonseverability presumption and resulting use of
Salerno-style facial challenges in the Section 5 context. But one important
distinction between prior congressional power analyses and the new con-
gruence-and-proportionality test is that the former involved a far looser
standard of review. As a result, the question raised under these prior
standards was whether facial validity of a statute precluded the possibility
that the statute exceeded Congress' powers as applied in a specific case.
The greater rigor of the congruence-and-proportionality test, however,
means that Section 5 legislation is much more likely to appear invalid if
assessed in its entirety. The question the Court faces therefore is differ-
ent; it is whether the probability of facial invalidity should preclude the
188. See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, No. 03-14326, 2004 WL 2191801, at *14, *18,
*21 (11th Cir. Oct. 1, 2004) (invalidating conviction for possession of child pornography
where government failed to prove defendant's activities had a substantial effect on
interstate commerce, but expressly leaving open whether statute could apply in another
context); United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1138-42 (9th Cir. 2003) (invalidating
federal criminal prohibition on machinegun possession only as applied to homemade
machineguns); United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1131-33 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding
Congress lacks power to prohibit noneconomic and noncommercial possession of child
pornography, but expressly refusing to assess the constitutionality of the federal
prohibition on possession of child pornography in other contexts).
189. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
190. See id. at 186-87; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933-35 (1997)
(invalidating background check and receipt-of-form requirements of the Brady Act but
refusing to invalidate other provisions that become operative only if local law enforcement
officer voluntarily complies with the statute, and further refusing to address severability of
firearms dealer requirements).
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possibility of as-applied validity. This change in standards and resultant
posture of the severability question may not make a difference in the end,
but it limits the extent to which this precedent is determinative of how
the Court should proceed today.
III. NONSEVERABILITY AND THE CONGRUENCE-AND-PROPORTIONALITY TEST
What remains then is the pivotal normative inquiry: Precedent aside,
how should the Court approach Section 5 challenges? More particularly,
do substantive concerns justify the Court in deviating from ordinary sever-
ability rules and treating Section 5 challenges as Salerno-style attacks re-
quiring examination of all of a Section 5 statute's applications? Two ar-
guments might be offered to justify such a deviation in the Section 5
context. The first, focusing on the analytic requirements of the congru-
ence-and-proportionality test, contends that applying a presumption of
severability is at odds with the logic of that inquiry. The second, focusing
instead on the values underlying the congruence-and-proportionality test
and other constitutional concerns, offers instrumental reasons to forego
application of ordinary severability rules. These two lines of argument
are taken up in turn below.
A. Severability and the Congruence-and-Proportionality Test's Substantive
Requirements
Determining whether severability is compatible with the substantive
content of the congruence-and-proportionality test is complicated by con-
fusion over what exactly the congruence-and-proportionality test means.
The test could be seen as simply imposing a form of heightened means-
end scrutiny or narrow tailoring requirement. Alternatively, it could re-
present a form of motive or purpose inquiry, which aims primarily at
identifying instances where Congress is using Fourteenth Amendment
remediation authority as a pretext for primary regulation. 19 1 Both of
these understandings are implicit in Chief Justice Rehnquist's claim that
the logic of the congruence-and-proportionality inquiry requires the
Court to consider all of a Section 5 statute's applications:
In applying the congruence-and-proportionality test, we ask
whether Congress has attempted to statutorily redefine the con-
stitutional rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
This question can only be answered by measuring the breadth of
a statute's coverage against the scope of the constitutional rights
it purports to enforce and the record of violations it purports to
remedy.
... The effect [of the majority's as-applied approach] is to rig the congru-
ence-and-proportionality test .... [T] he majority's approach is not really
191. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13-14, 18-19 (1883) (describing
Fourteenth Amendment as authorizing only corrective legislation, not "primary" or direct
legislation).
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an assessment of whether Title II is "appropriate legislation" at all, but a
test of whether the Court can conceive of a hypothetical statute narrowly
tailored enough to constitute valid prophylactic legislation. 192
Although closely related, these two accounts of the congruence-and-
proportionality test suggest different justifications for deviating from or-
dinary severability rules, and thus each will be discussed separately. A
third argument for nonseverability, also implicit in the Chief Justice's
statement, contends that the general nature of the congruence-and-pro-
portionality inquiry inherently mandates facial treatment.
1. The Congruence-and-Proportionality Test as a Narrow Tailoring Require-
ment. - As it has emerged from recent decisions, with its emphasis on
identifying an established pattern of state constitutional violations to
which Congress could legitimately respond and on ensuring the means
Congress chooses do not sweep too broadly, the congruence-and-propor-
tionality test appears as a form of narrow tailoring analysis. The Court's
continued willingness to grant Congress some wiggle room-allowing
Congress to "enact so-called prophylactic legislation that proscribes
facially constitutional conduct, in order to prevent and deter unconstitu-
tional conduct"' 93-suggests that the type of tailoring the test requires is
more akin to intermediate than strict scrutiny. 194 The test does, however,
require significantly greater tailoring than ordinary rationality review, as
the amount of legislation to fail its strictures suggests.' 95
In several other narrow tailoring contexts, the Court deviates from
the ordinary presumption of severability and allows Salerno-style facial
challenges-statutes regulating abortion or restricting speech are the
most widely acknowledged examples. 196 Such deviation may stem from
prophylactic concerns, and thus be more relevant to the instrumental
192. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 2005 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(citations omitted); see also Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Doff, Constitutional Existence
Conditions and Judicial Review, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1105, 1157-58 (2003) (arguing that
application severability is inconsistent with the congruence-and-proportionality test, which
asks "whether the text Congress enacted was congruent and proportional to the record of
constitutional violations Congress considered").
193. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1985 (quoting Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721, 727-28 (2003)); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997).
194. On the degree of narrow tailoring congruence-and-proportionality requires,
compare I Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 5-16, at 959 (3d ed. 2000)
(describing review as "something between intermediate and strict scrutiny"), with Michael
W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Fores, 111
Harv. L. Rev. 153, 166 (1997) (suggesting standard akin to intermediate scrutiny), with
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 Yale L.J. 441, 477 (2000) [hereinafter Post &
Siegel, Equal Protection] (arguing that the test "seem[s] analogous to the narrow tailoring
required by strict scrutiny").
195. See Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5
Powers, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1127, 1132-33, 1153-58 (2000); McConnell, supra note 194, at
165-66.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29.
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concerns discussed below. But it also reflects in part the fact that given
the narrow tailoring requirements mandated by substantive constitutional
law, a court is less likely to be able to fashion a legitimate construction of
the statute that allows it to conform to constitutional limits. Significantly,
however, where the Court is able to construe a statute requiring height-
ened scrutiny to fit constitutional requirements, it generally does just
that. Thus, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court (in several different
opinions) invalidated the husband-notification and related notice re-
quirements of Pennsylvania's abortion law that it found unconstitutional
and upheld the rest.' 97 Similarly, in United States v. Grace, in response to a
facial challenge to a federal prohibition on "display of any flag, banner or
device" on the Supreme Court's building and grounds, the Court held
the prohibition was unconstitutional "as applied" to "the public sidewalks
surrounding the building," thus severing this application of the statute
from other applications. 198
Moreover, when the Court enjoins the challenged statute in toto, it is
not because the Court rejects application of ordinary severability rules,
but rather because the Court holds that under those rules unconstitu-
tional aspects of the statute cannot legitimately be severed. Thus, in
Stenberg v. Carhart, the Court concluded that Nebraska's statute banning
"partial birth" abortions imposed an undue burden on abortion because
it covered dilation and evacuation, the moit common and safest method
of previability abortions, as well as dilation and extraction, the method
often referred to as "partial birth" abortion. 19 9 Rather than imposing a
narrowing construction on the statute, or certifying the question of the
statute's meaning to the state supreme court, the Court ruled that the
statute was unconstitutional. But the Court nowhere suggested that ordi-
nary severability rules were inapplicable simply because the statute was
subject to heightened scrutiny. Instead, it refused to sever the statute's
unconstitutional applications or overbroad language on the grounds that
197. 505 U.S. 833, 898, 901 (1992); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11-12
(1985) (invalidating state provision authorizing police to use all necessary means to effect
arrest of fleeing defendant only as applied to use of deadly force against unarmed,
nondangerous suspects).
198. 461 U.S. 171, 172-73, 183-84 (1983); see also United States v. Nat'l Treasury
Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 478 (1995) (enjoining application of broad honoraria ban
for federal employees only as applied to lower-level executive branch employees); Virginia
v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988) ("It has long been a tenet of First
Amendment law that in determining a facial challenge to a statute, if it be readily
susceptible to a narrowing construction that would make it constitutional, it will be
upheld." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S.
491, 504-05 (1985) (refusing to facially invalidate state obscenity law but instead partially
invalidating provision insofar as it reached constitutionally protected activity); New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 n.24 (1982) (noting that faced with an overbreadth challenge, a
federal court "should, of course, construe the statute to avoid constitutional problems, if
the statute is subject to such a limiting construction" and in any event, "if it is severable,
only the unconstitutional portion is to be invalidated").
199. 530 U.S. 914, 937-38 (2000).
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doing so would be at odds with the standard severability requirement that
a narrowing construction be "reasonable and readily apparent" on the
face of the statute. 200 To take another recent example, in City of Chicago
v. Morales,20 ' the Court held Chicago's antiloitering statute unconstitu-
tional "on its face" for failing to provide citizens with fair notice of what
conduct was prohibited and for failing to contain adequate guidelines to
prevent arbitrary law enforcement. Narrowing was eschewed not because
the First Amendment was involved but because vagueness "permeate[d]
the ordinance." 20 2 In addition, Morales came to the Court from the Illi-
nois Supreme Court, which held the ordinance facially unconstitutional
rather than narrowing its scope. 20 3 As a result, the United States Su-
preme Court's similar refusal to sever accorded with the established rule
that state court rulings on the meaning of state statutes are binding and a
litigant can challenge the statute as authoritatively construed and applied
in her case.
This question of whether a state or federal statute is involved de-
serves emphasis. When the Court refuses to sever the unconstitutionally
overbroad aspects of a state statute, the state is still able to seek the
needed curative construction from its own courts. 204 But where federal
statutes are involved, no such option exists; if the Court refuses to sever,
the burden then falls on Congress to amend the statute to fit constitu-
tional requirements. Section 5 legislation is, of course, federal legisla-
tion, and thus whatever willingness the Court displays to presume non-
severability in First Amendment overbreadth challenges to state statutes
does not necessarily carry over.
This is not to say that the congruence-and-proportionality test im-
poses no substantive limits on the extent to which a court can engage in
200. Id. at 944 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 330 (1988)); see also Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884-85 (1997) (facially invalidating statutory provisions found
unconstitutional because provisions were not readily susceptible to a saving construction).
Moreover, in Stenberg, the Court held that absence of a health exception also rendered the
statute constitutionally infirm, so adopting a narrowing construction would not have led
the Court to sustain it in any event. See 530 U.S. at 934-36. In Hope Clinic v. Ryan, a
decision the Supreme Court later vacated in light of Stenberg, the Seventh Circuit displayed
far more willingness to engage in creative judicial reconstruction to avoid holding "partial
birth" abortion statutes unconstitutional. See 195 F.3d 857, 864-66 (7th Cir. 1999) (en
banc), vacated, 530 U.S. 1271 (2000), decision on remand, 249 F.3d 603, 604-05 (7th Cir.
2001) (holding relevant portions of statutes unconstitutional).
201. 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
202. Id. at 54 & n.22.
203. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 NE.2d 53, 64 (Ill. 1997) (holding "[t]he
gang loitering ordinance is not reasonably susceptible to a limiting construction which
would affirm its validity" because it was "clear" that Chicago's City Council had
intentionally "crafted an exceptionally broad ordinance").
204. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 367 (2003) (holding statute facially
unconstitutional but leaving open possibility that state supreme court might interpret the
statute so that it conformed to constitutional requirements on remand); Osborne v. Ohio,
495 U.S. 103, 115-22 & n.12 (1990) (upholding retrospective application of an adequately
narrowed statute).
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severability. The fact that the test represents a form of narrow tailoring
may justify deviating from the presumption of severability at least insofar
as to require courts to entertain what are in essence facial overbreadth
challenges. More importantly, as noted above, the recent Section 5 deci-
sions make the constitutionality of Section 5 legislation turn on the na-
ture of the constitutional right in question and on the presence of a pat-
tern and history of states violating this right. 20 5 As a result, the
congruence-and-proportionality test appears to preclude considering the
constitutionality of Section 5 legislation in the context of a traditional as-
applied challenge, where the court simply assesses whether a statute can
be applied to the particular conduct before it. Indeed, the majority in
Lane acknowledged this characteristic of the test, assessing whether Title
II was constitutional "as it applies to the class of cases implicating the
accessibility ofjudicial services" in the states generally, rather than limit-
ing itself to considering whether Tennessee had violated the plaintiffs'
particular rights of access to the courts. 20 6
But these limitations are relatively minor, and narrow tailoring alone
does not justify ajudicial refusal to apply ordinary severability analysis in
responding to Section 5 challenges on the merits. Lane, moreover, is re-
ally an instance of this latter use of severability. The Court did not avoid
the constitutional challenge asserted by Tennessee; instead, having found
Title II constitutional in regard to enforcing the right of access to the
courts, it applied the presumption of severability to avoid considering
whether other applications of Title II were also constitutional. More pre-
cisely, Lane affirms the ability of states to challenge Section 5 legislation
as unconstitutional on its face because it is insufficiently tailored to reme-
dying a constitutional violation. All Lane rejects is the proposition that a
court, having found Section 5 legislation to be constitutional in one con-
text, must proceed to consider whether the legislation is constitutional in
all its applications.
2. The Congruence-and-Proportionality Test as a Purpose Inquiry. - An-
other way of understanding the congruence-and-proportionality test is as
a purpose or motive inquiry, because its underlying concern is to ensure
that Congress does not use Section 5 as a pretext for imposing substantive
regulations on the states that otherwise would be outside of Congress'
powers.20 7 Support for such an understanding of the test comes from the
Court's consistent insistence that valid Section 5 legislation must aim at
205. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
206. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1993 (2004).
207. For accounts of the congruence-and-proportionality test as a purpose inquiry,
see, e.g., J. Randy Beck, The Heart of Federalism: Pretext Review of Means-Ends
Relationships, 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 407, 440-46 (2003); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The
Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 Harv. L. Rev.
54, 131-32 (1997) [hereinafter Fallon, Foreword]; see also Post & Siegel, Equal Protection,
supra note 194, at 457-58, 460-63 (noting the ways the Court appears to be using
congruence-and-proportionality as a means of uncovering illicit congressional purpose).
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remedying, not redefining, Fourteenth Amendment violations. 20 8 More
than a separate interpretation, this view of the test represents an addi-
tional spin on the narrow tailoring account; the reason for imposing such
scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate congressional intent.20 9 Signifi-
candy, some commentators argue that claims of unconstitutional purpose
represent an instance where the Court should refuse to sever unconstitu-
tional applications because "[i]f a statute serves an [unconstitutional]
purpose, . . . [t]he invalid . . . purpose pervades all of the provision's
applications. ' 2 °1 0 Thus, if the congruence-and-proportionality test repre-
sents an inquiry into congressional purpose, application of a nonsever-
ability presumption might be justified.
In fact, however, the recent Section 5 decisions are hard to square
with any understanding of the congruence-and-proportionality test as an
inquiry into Congress' actual motivations. 2 11 One central characteristic
208. See, e.g., Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1986; Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721, 728-29 (2003); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
209. Smoking out illegitimate purpose is a prominent justification for use of strict
scrutiny in the equal protection context. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326
(2003) ("We apply strict scrutiny to all racial classifications to 'smoke out illegitimate uses
of race by assuring that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use
of a highly suspect tool.'" (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989))). Debate has long
raged over the intelligibility of subjective intent inquiries, with some justices and scholars
questioning the possibility of ascertaining the intent of a multimember body. See, e.g.,
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 558 (1993) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (arguing "it is virtually impossible to determine the singular motive of a
collective legislative body" (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968) ("What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a
statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are
sufficiently high [in constitutional litigation] for us to eschew guesswork."); John Hart Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1205, 1212-22
(1970) (discussing O'Brien and other criticisms of purpose inquiries). This debate is
beyond the scope of this Essay. Instead, for purposes here, it is enough to presume the
theoretical possibility of discerning Congress' actual purpose and ask instead whether such
purpose should affect the constitutionality of Section 5 legislation.
210. Dorf, supra note 20, at 279; see also Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 20, at 1345 &
n.124 (agreeing with Dorf, but listing some exceptions). One instance where the Court
does apply severability notwithstanding a finding of unconstitutional purpose is in racial
redistricting cases. Districts drawn primarily on the basis of race are unconstitutional, see,
e.g., Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,913 (1995), but the Court does not respond to finding
that one district was unconstitutionally drawn primarily because of race by invalidating the
districting scheme as a whole, even though lumping members of one race in a particular
district inevitably affects the contours of other districts. Instead, the Court has held that
voters lack standing to challenge any district but their own on racial redistricting grounds,
thereby precluding facial overbreadth challenges. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737,
742-47 (1995).
211. See Beck, supra note 207, at 436-46; see also Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H.
Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique, Morrison, and the Future of Federal Antidiscrimination
Law, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 109, 132-35 (describing congruence-and-proportionality as
applying only where the legitimacy of congressional ends is unclear and Court wants to
give Congress the benefit of the doubt); Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 194, at
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of the recent decisions is the Court's insistence on independently scruti-
nizing whether a pattern of state constitutional violations existed and
whether a Section 5 measure is adequately tied to remedying those viola-
tions. 2 12 Moreover, in applying the congruence-and-proportionality test,
the Court at times has looked at judicial evidence of state constitutional
violations not identified by Congress. 21 3 Both of these practices are more
in keeping with an inquiry into whether challenged legislation objectively
appears remedial than into actual congressional intent. So too is the
Court's willingness to apply the congruence-and-proportionality test with
full vigor to legislation enacted before Boerne.2 14 In the latter case, an
inquiry into Congress' purpose would more sensibly focus on whether the
legislation appeared sufficiently remedial under then-existing standards.
Regardless, what remains wholly unexplained is why congressional
intent should matter in analyzing the constitutionality of Section 5 legisla-
tion. In this regard, it is worth noting that in the Commerce Clause con-
text, the Court has long ruled that Congress' actual purpose is irrelevant
where Congress is clearly regulating interstate commerce. 215 Even under
the Court's pre-New Deal restrictive view of the commerce power, it held
that Congress' motivation in enacting regulations was immaterial when
Congress targeted interstate commerce on the face of a statute.2 16 The
459-60, 477, 510-11 (describing both Kimel and Morrison as going beyond an investigation
into whether Congress intended legislation to be remedial and arguing the congruence-
and-proportionality test is an "odd and awkward way" to identify "legislation enacted for
the purpose of defining the substantive meaning of the Equal Protection Clause").
212. See, e.g., Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728-37; Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-73
(2001); see also McConnell, supra note 194, at 166 (describing Court as independently
assessing the remedial character of Section 5 legislation under congruence-and-
proportionality test); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and
Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112
Yale. LJ. 1943, 1964-65 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism]
(same).
213. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1989-90 ("The historical experience that Title II reflects is
also documented in this Court's cases . . . [and t]he decisions of other courts . . . ."). In
Lane, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority's willingness to go beyond the
congressional record, see id. at 2000-01 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting), but he pursued the
same practice in his majority opinion in Hibbs, see 538 U.S. at 729, 733-34 (Rehnquist,
C.J.) (relying on judicial decisions chronicling state gender discrimination in employment
and examination of state family leave policies in concluding that sufficient record of state
gender discrimination in the administration of leave benefits existed to justify
congressional remedy).
214. The congruence-and-proportionality test first appeared in Boerne in 1997. RFRA,
there addressed, was enacted in 1993, see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511
(1997). The ADA was enacted in 1990, see Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1982; the FMLA in 1993, see
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 724; the VAWA in 1994, see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 605
(2000); the Plant Remedy Act in 1992, see Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 631 (1999); and the ADEA was extended to the states in
1974, see Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 68 (2000).
215. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S 100, 115 (1941).
216. See, e.g., Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322-23 (1913); Champion v. Ames
(Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 355-56 (1903).
20051
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
emphasis on jurisdictional elements in Lapez and Morrison, as well as the
Court's continued willingness to allow Congress broad room to regulate
economic activity (and reaffirmance of the constitutionality of federal
legislation motivated by noncommercial concerns, such as the Civil
Rights Act), indicate that the Court continues to adhere to this view. 21 7
The Court plainly believes that the difference in scope of Congress' com-
merce and Section 5 powers necessitates more rigorous means-ends scru-
tiny of the latter. But it has never offered a justification for why legisla-
tion that satisfies this scrutiny, in part or whole, should be rendered
entirely invalid on the basis of congressional purpose.218
Perhaps most importantly, viewing the congruence-and-proportion-
ality test as entailing, even in part, an assessment of Congress' actual in-
tent has significant ramifications for Congress' institutional indepen-
dence. The Court's decisions increasingly suggest that the key to whether
Section 5 legislation will be upheld as congruent and proportional is the
standard of judicial review applicable to the underlying constitutional
right itself. Legislation seeking to vindicate rights that trigger only ration-
ality review if sued on directly is likely to exceed Congress' Section 5 pow-
ers; by contrast, legislation aimed at securing rights receiving heightened
scrutiny has a far greater chance of judicial sustainment.219 As a result,
some have criticized the recent Section 5 decisions as judicial power
grabs, arguing that the Court is illegitimately arrogating to itself the
power to determine the scope of Fourteenth Amendment rights. 220 The
217. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609, 611; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558, 562
(1995).
218. In addition, while constitutional tests frequently include purpose inquiries, these
often take an objective form. Rather than probing for evidence of actual purpose, for
example, the Court often relies on the presence of facial classifications as justification for
applying heightened scrutiny, and a subjectively benign purpose does not suffice to lower
the level of scrutiny. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226-29
(1995) (applying strict scrutiny to racial classifications regardless of specific race targeted);
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117
(1991) (applying strict scrutiny to content-based speech regulation notwithstanding
legitimate legislative motivation). On the use of purpose tests in constitutional analysis, see
generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 Cal. L. Rev.
297 (1997) (discussing legislative purpose test in constitutional law); Fallon, Foreword,
supra note 207, at 90-102 (same).
219. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735-36 (arguing that presence of a heightened standard of
scrutiny made it "easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations");
see also Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1988 (underscoring that Title II of the ADA aimed not only at
remedying disability discrimination, which is subject only to rationality review, but "also
seeks to enforce a variety of other basic constitutional guarantees, infringements of which
are subject to more searching judicial review"). On the importance of standard of review
to the scope of Congress' enforcement power, see Post & Siegel, Legislative
Constitutionalism, supra note 212, at 1964-67.
220. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 195, at 1168-86; Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme
Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 5, 136-53 (2001);
McConnell, supra note 194, at 181-92; Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism, supra
note 212, at 1966-71, 1980-84.
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Court has responded by maintaining that it is simply adhering to Marbury
v. Madison's insistence that the judicial role is to say what the law is in
cases properly before it.22 1 But if the congruence-and-proportionality
test is viewed as a purpose inquiry, the Court will have traveled substan-
tially beyond simply asserting a power to ensure that Section 5 legislation
conforms to judicial understandings of Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Instead, the Court in essence would be requiring Congress to adhere to
these judicial understandings in its deliberations or risk having its enact-
ments invalidated-even if, objectively assessed, these enactments do not
add to the scope of judicially established Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Such a move would represent an extraordinary degree ofjudicial control
over Congress' exercise of its enumerated powers.2 22
3. Inherent Facial Character of the Congruence-and-Proportionality Inquiry.
- Finally, a third justification for a facial approach to Section 5 chal-
lenges merits brief discussion. The discussion in Part II established that
Congress' power to act under Section 5 (and in other contexts) is as-
sessed on a general basis; again, in Hibbs and Lane, the Court relied on
evidence of a pattern of constitutional violations in the states generally as
justifying application of Section 5 legislation to specific states, without
inquiring into whether Nevada and Tennessee were guilty as well. As a
result, it might be argued that challenges to legislation as exceeding such
power are inherently facial in character because these challenges necessa-
rily must look beyond the specific facts of the case at hand. Matthew
Adler and Michael Dorf recently offered an argument along these lines
when they maintained that the requirements for valid Section 5 legisla-
tion, or indeed any congressional legislation, are constitutional "exis-
tence conditions. ' '223 By this, they meant that the inquiry in a congres-
sional power challenge focuses on whether the legislation is valid as a
221. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also Hibbs, 538
U.S. at 728 ("[I] t falls to this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional
guarantees."); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) ("When the Court has
interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province of the Judicial Branch, which
embraces the duty to say what the law is." (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177)).
222. See Kramer, supra note 220, at 13 (distinguishing between judicial supremacy
and judicial sovereignty on similar grounds). Robert Post and Reva Siegel have suggested
that, on the contrary, it is the Court's independent inquiry into whether Section 5
legislation is remedial, and not its investigation into Congress' purpose, that represents the
greatest intrusion on congressional power. See Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note
194, at 459-62, 511. This conclusion might follow if the subjective inquiry were limited to
whether Congress intended its legislation to be remedial, given its own understanding of
the rights involved. But given the Court's insistence that Congress lacks power to deviate
substantively from judicial pronouncements regarding the scope of Fourteenth
Amendment rights, any inquiry into purpose would appear to be an investigation into
whether Congress intended its legislation to remedy violations of such rights as judicially
defined. Indeed, a purpose inquiry would appear to preclude precisely the kind of
policentric constitutional interpretation they advocate, as they subsequently appear to
acknowledge. See Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism, supra note 212, at 2023; see
also id. at 2020-45 (setting out policentric model).
223. See Adler & Dorf, supra note 192, at 1108-10, 1119-20.
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general matter, not on whether the legislation can be constitutionally ap-
plied in a particular case. 224
This line of reasoning has some bite, as far as it goes. But it does not
go very far. To be sure, this generalized character of the congruence-and-
proportionality test has some effect on the form of Section 5 challenges.
As noted above, it meant that the Court in Lane could not sustain Title II
simply on evidence that Tennessee had discriminated against the plain-
tiffs as they claimed; instead, a wider pattern and history of discrimina-
tion by the states was required.22 5 But nothing in the general nature of
the congruence-and-proportionality inquiry prohibits a court, having
found application of a statute to be constitutional in a particular class of
cases, from determining whether this class of applications is separable
from the remainder of the statute. 22 6 Put differently, the logic of the
congruence-and-proportionality inquiry does mandate judicial assess-
ment of the constitutionality of congressional legislation in terms of some
general rule the statute embodies. Again, however, both facial and as-
applied challenges can represent such general rule attacks. Whether a
statute's validity is assessed solely in regard to a particular class of cases or
in light of all its applications affects the substance of the rule at issue, but
not its general character.
B. Instrumental Arguments Against Severability Under the Congruence-and-
Proportionality Test
In addition to arguments from precedent and the substantive con-
tent of the congruence-and-proportionality test, the Chief Justice also of-
fered instrumental reasons for denying severability. He maintained that
assessing the constitutionality of Section 5 legislation on an as-applied
basis "eliminates any incentive for Congress to craft [Section 5] legisla-
tion for the purpose of remedying or deterring actual constitutional viola-
tions. ' 227 Instead, it will fall to the courts "to sort out which hypothetical
applications of an undifferentiated statute... may be enforced," with the
result that "States will be subjected to substantial litigation in a piecemeal
attempt to vindicate their Eleventh Amendment rights. '228 These claims
224. See id. at 1151-55.
225. See supra notes 205-206 and accompanying text.
226. To their credit, Adler and Dorf acknowledge that the availability of severability
differentiates congressional power challenges from other instances where the validity of
legislation is put at issue. They argue against broad use of application severability in
congressional power challenges on the grounds that "all content-based existence
conditions would function as application conditions." Adler & Doff, supra note 192, at
1155-57. This response seems to presume the very question at issue, however: whether the
need to assess the validity of congressional power legislation on a general basis is satisfied
once a court determines that the statute is constitutional in regard to a particular class of
cases, or if instead the court must also determine the constitutionality of all or most of its
applications.
227. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 2005 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
228. Id.
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parallel the standard instrumental arguments for facial challenges and
nonseverability in First Amendment overbreadth cases, specifically that
requiring individuals to challenge overbroad statutes on a case-by-case ba-
sis risks "chilling" exercise of First Amendment rights and undermines
legislative incentives to draft statutes that take First Amendment concerns
seriously. 22 9 To these two instrumental arguments could be added a
third, also raised by the ChiefJustice: Allowing severability in the Section
5 context imposes significant burdens on the federal courts and thus devi-
ates from "the proper role of the Judiciary."2 30
Such instrumental concerns properly inform severability doctrine.
The presumption of severability embodied in ordinary severability doc-
trine is not constitutionally mandated. Once the constitutionality of a
statute is put in question by one subject to the statute's enforcement, the
case and controversy requirements of Article III are satisfied. 23 1 Instead,
like the Court's disavowal of facial challenges, the presumption of sever-
ability is rooted in policy considerations, including general constitutional
values of federalism and separation of powers; the presumption allows
courts to avoid wholesale invalidation of statutes when curing limited con-
stitutional violations. But although relevant to severability analysis, these
instrumental arguments do not suffice to justify deviating from ordinary
severability rules.
1. Nonseverability and Deterrence of State Assertions of Constitutional
Rights. - Undoubtedly, an as-applied approach to Section 5 challenges,
under which the Court only considers the constitutionality of legislation
229. See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) (describing First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine as resting on "concern that the threat of enforcement of an
overbroad law may deter or 'chill' constitutionally protected speech" because "[mlany
persons, rather than undertake the considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of
vindicating their rights through case-by-case litigation, will choose simply to abstain from
speech"); Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581 (1989) ("The [overbreadth] doctrine
is predicated on the danger that an overly broad statute, if left in place, may cause persons
whose expression is constitutionally protected to refrain from exercising their rights for
fear of criminal sanctions."); Fallon, Making Sense, supra note 65, at 867-75, 884-89
(describing chill and legislative incentive arguments). But see Monaghan, supra note 27,
at 31-33 (describing incentive argument for overbreadth regarding federal statutes but
concluding it fails to justify nonseverability). For an initial and influential academic
analysis of the chill argument for overbreadth, see Note, The First Amendment
Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 844, 852-58, 865-82 (1970).
230. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2005-06 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
231. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court justifies its willingness to entertain
overbreadth challenges on the ground that the rule against allowing an individual to
challenge a statute's application to third parties reflects simply prudential limits on
standing. See, e.g., United States v. Sabri, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1948 (2004); City of Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999) (plurality opinion). As noted earlier, see supra notes
60-66 and accompanying text, dispute exists regarding whether overbreadth challenges
are correctly viewed as a species of third-party standing or as rooted in the valid rule
requirement, as Henry Monaghan has argued. But individuals' constitutional standing to
bring such challenges is only that much clearer under Monaghan's account, and thus this
dispute makes no difference to the point here.
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in regard to the case at hand and severs other applications, will lead to
"piecemeal" litigation. States will not be able to procure a determinative
assessment of a Section 5 statute's constitutionality in a single proceed-
ing. But this is true whenever a court denies a facial challenge or severs
applications of a statute not directly before it. In fact, in its justifications
for limiting the availability of facial challenges, the Court usually de-
scribes forcing constitutional litigation to proceed in a "piecemeal" fash-
ion as a virtue, not a vice.
The question therefore is whether something unique to the Section
5 context renders concerns about piecemeal proceedings more salient.
One distinguishing feature of Section 5 litigation is that it overwhelm-
ingly involves a state as a party, and does so universally when the underly-
ing issue is whether a congressional abrogation of Eleventh Amendment
immunity is constitutional. 23 2 Moreover, in ordinary overbreadth chal-
lenges, the litigant wants to attack application of a statute to a hypotheti-
cal third party, making it speculative whether such an application will oc-
cur. But in the Section 5 context, it is at least plausible to expect that a
state attacking other applications of a statute will itself be subject to those
applications. The as-applied approach therefore not only forces piece-
meal assessment of a statute's constitutionality, but also piecemeal assess-
ment of a particular party's rights.
On the other hand, states are better positioned than most to handle
such repeated litigation. While defending challenges takes resources,
states have attorney general offices and staffs already in place to handle
litigation on their behalf. Increasingly, state attorneys general are collab-
orating on Section 5 challenges and other litigation, lessening the re-
source burden. 233 Moreover, states often have a financial incentive to
litigate Section 5 challenges, because success on such challenges serves to
remove their liability for money damages in private suits. And states do
not face criminal penalties for engaging in conduct prohibited by Section
5 legislation. These latter two features in particular serve to distinguish
232. The cases that do not involve states as parties are those where Section 5
legislation targets private action-a category rendered perhaps a null set by United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620-27 (2000)-and those where the legislation authorizes
actions against individual state officials, see, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,
24-25 (1960).
233. See Jason Lynch, Note, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State
Attorneys General in Multistate Litigation, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1998, 2002-09 (2001)
(detailing substantial increase in state attorney general cooperation and multistate
litigation since 1980); see also Steven Andersen, Power of the State: The Rise of the State
Attorneys General, Corp. Legal Times, Aug. 2003, at 1, 38 (describing rise in activity and
power of state attorneys general); David Bank, States to Investigate Oracle Bid: Attorneys
General Agree to Cooperate, Share Costs to Review PeopleSoft Offer, Wall St. J., Aug. 1,
2003, at A2 (noting attorneys general from almost thirty states formally agreed to
cooperate in antitrust investigation).
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Section 5 from First Amendment challenges and make claims of chill
much harder to justify in regard to the former.2 3 4
This leaves the claim that federalism values should make the Court
especially wary of imposing litigation burdens on states. The states' dis-
tinctive role in the constitutional order might seem to justify special treat-
ment in the form of denying severability when congressional legislation is
challenged as treading on their constitutional prerogatives. But if so,
then severability should also be denied whenever states challenge con-
gressional legislation, and perhaps whenever congressional legislation is
challenged as violating state autonomy or intruding into the states'
proper sphere. 23 5 Yet the rejection of facial challenges in the Spending
Clause context announced in Sabri, as well as the rejection of judicial
protection against direct federal regulation of the states announced in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,2 3 6 indicate that such
special solicitude for the "states as states" does not apply across the board.
Moreover, recognition of the distinctive position of the states might in-
stead counsel the Court to limit itself to considering the constitutionality
of Section 5 statutes only as implicated by the case before it, as a state may
234. See Carroll, supra note 93, at 1061-62 (arguing that states will not be deterred
from asserting their rights). Moreover, several scholars have questioned the empirical
basis for the chilling effect argument even in regard to the First Amendment, given that
citizens are unlikely to be sufficiently aware of how a statute is written to be chilled from
engaging in expressive activities, and even less likely to be aware of curative constructions
claimed to reduce such chilling effect. See Fallon, Making Sense, supra note 65, at 885-88
(describing and responding to criticisms of chilling effect as justification for First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine).
235. Tom Lee raised with me the possibility that a separate nonseverability rule
should exist in Eleventh Amendment challenges, reflecting the presumption against states
being subjected to financial liability in private suits that the Amendment represents.
Although an intriguing suggestion, I am ultimately unpersuaded. The presumption
against state financial liability is already incorporated into Section 5 analysis by the
requirement that congressional abrogations of state sovereign immunity be clearly stated.
See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000). Imposing a nonseverability rule in
addition would seem to overcount the Eleventh Amendment, especially given the Court's
repeated holding that valid exercises of Congress' Section 5 power can abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1985; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456
(1976). Nor, intuitively, is the Eleventh Amendment's protection against private financial
claims so central to federalism as to single the Eleventh Amendment out from other
federalism contexts, such as anticommandeering challenges, where the Court's precedent
makes clear no special nonseverability presumption applies. See Ernest A. Young, The
Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 51-65 (2004); supra notes 189-190
and accompanying text. The practical effects of a special Eleventh Amendment
nonseverability rule also counsel against it, as such a rule would implausibly make the
courts' analytic approach turn on plaintiffs' remedial choices: Where plaintiffs sought
monetary relief for violations of a Section 5 statute, a court would have to consider all the
statute's applications to determine its constitutionality, but if plaintiffs sought only
injunctive relief, to which the Eleventh Amendment is not applicable, the court would
limit its assessment to the application at hand.
236. 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985).
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prefer to take a more discriminating approach and not challenge all of a
statute's applications. 237
In any event, the claim that federalism values mandate application of
a special nonseverability rule in the Section 5 context, at a minimum
must be expressly stated and justified, something the Court has yet to do.
Such a defense is all the more necessary given that the Court cannot
grant the states special status here without simultaneously disregarding
the distinctive position of Congress. Denying severability means denying
Congress the right to have its statutes remain in force insofar as they fall
within its enumerated powers. Again, this goes beyond the Court's insist-
ing that its determinations of the meaning of Fourteenth Amendment
rights set the contours of Congress' enforcement power; instead, the
Court would be refusing to uphold Section 5 legislation, even to the extent
such legislation conformed to such judicial determinations, if the statutes also
had applications that went beyond. Simply invoking the respect due
states is therefore inadequate to deny severability unless some reason ex-
ists why respect for the states should so significantly trump respect for
Congress in this context.
2. Nonseverability and Congressional Incentives. - The incentive argu-
ment might appear, at first glance, to justify prioritizing respect for the
states over Congress. This argument maintains that priority should be
given to protecting the states because Congress is in a position to protect
its own interests by framing its legislation with greater care; the states,
however, have no resort but the courts. Denying severability gives Con-
gress a needed incentive to take constitutional limits on its Section 5 pow-
ers seriously; otherwise, as the ChiefJustice maintained, Congress will just
rely on the courts to do its work.
237. Numerous states, for example, signed onto amicus briefs in Lane and Hibbs
arguing that the statutes challenged in those cases were constitutional, at least in some
applications. See Brief of the States of Minnesota et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at *1, Lane (No. 02-1667), 2003 WL 22733906 (arguing that Title II is
constitutional in all its applications and noting "[a]lthough the states more typically
advocate the application of Eleventh Amendment immunity, this case is different .... The
states should support every effort to eradicate the effects of the documented long-term,
pervasive and invidious discrimination against people with disabilities in the provision of
public services"); Brief of Kansas and Delaware as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents
at *1, Lane (No. 02-1667), 2003 WL 22733907 (arguing Title II is constitutional as applied
to pursuit and enforcement of fundamental due process rights); Brief for States of New
York et al. as Amici Curiae in support of Respondents at *1, Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (No. 01-1368), 2002 WL 31427565 ("[Alllowing our citizens to
enforce their FMLA rights without restriction is consistent with the obligation of attorneys
general of the amici curiae States to protect the public interest by ensuring that workplace
gender discrimination against our citizens, with all of its vestiges, is eliminated."); see also
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 661-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that "attorneys general in the
overwhelming majority of States (38) supported congressional legislation" on the problem
of violence against women). Other states argued that Title II of the ADA and the FMLA
were unconstitutional. See Brief of Amici Curiae Alabama et al. in Support of Petitioner at
*6-*22, Lane (No. 02-1667), 2003 WL 22176110; Brief for the States of Alabama et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at *4-*30, Hibbs (No. 01-1368), 2002 WL 1974391.
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But this incentive argument assumes that Congress will not take con-
stitutional limits on its Section 5 poCver (limits members have sworn by
oath to uphold) seriously absent judicial encouragement. 23 8 Such an as-
sumption is at odds with the respect due a coordinate branch of govern-
ment and the usual judicial course of presuming that congressional legis-
lation is constitutional. 239 More importantly, reliance on the courts to
ensure Section 5 legislation fits constitutional limits cannot be facilely dis-
missed as congressional irresponsibility. To begin with, the scope of
Fourteenth Amendment rights is not always so clear. For instance, the
Court has vacillated tremendously in setting out the constitutional right
of access to the courts, even acknowledging dispute as to whether the
substantive basis of the right rests in equal protection or due process. 240
As a result, Congress, in good faith, may not be able to discern clearly the
bounds of its Section 5 authority. In addition, the Court sometimes in-
vokes one standard but in practice appears to apply another, suggesting
greater constitutional protection than it may be willing to acknowledge
overtly. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.'s rigorous use of sup-
posed rationality review in addressing equal protection claims brought by
the disabled is a prime example. 24 1 It seems unfair to penalize Congress
for not correctly guessing that the Court meant the standard it formally
invoked in that decision, not the standard it actually applied. And of
course, the Court's recent Section 5 decisions all involved statutes en-
acted before the Court adopted the congruence-and-proportionality test
and at a time when the Court was instead far more deferential in its re-
238. Justice Scalia for one has voiced skepticism that Congress takes such
constitutional limits seriously:
My Court is fond of saying that acts of Congress come to the Court with the
presumption of constitutionality. That presumption reflects Congress' [ ] status as
a coequal branch of government with its own responsibilities to the Constitution.
But if Congress is going to take the attitude that it will do anything it can get away
with and let the Supreme Court worry about the Constitution ... then perhaps
that presumption is unwarranted.
Justice Antonin Scalia, Speaking at the Telecommunications Law and Policy Symposium
(Apr. 18, 2000), quoted in Ruth Colker &JamesJ. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 Mich. L.
Rev. 80, 80 (2001).
239. See Morison, 529 U.S. at 607.
240. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120-21 (1996). Compare Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (holding due process "prohibit[s] a State from
denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek
judicial dissolution of their marriages"), with United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444-46
(1973) (holding due process does not require waiving fees in bankruptcy proceeding), and
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 658-61 (1973) (holding neither due process nor equal
protection requires waiving fee to obtain review of welfare benefits termination).
241. 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1995); id. at 458-60 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court's refusal to apply the Railway Express Agency,
Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), one-step-at-a-time rule or acknowledge legitimacy of
city's property value concern was incompatible with ordinary rationality review).
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view of Section 5 legislation. 242 That these statutes do not hew to the
test's requirements is hardly Congress' fault.
The most serious flaw in the incentive argument, however, is that the
effect of denying nonseverability would be to unduly narrow Congress'
Section 5 powers. Accordi'ng to the Court, Congress has some room to
maneuver and has the power to prohibit some state conduct that is not
unconstitutional: "Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional vi-
olations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if
in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional. '24 3
Indeed, all but Justice Scalia agree that Congress' Section 5 power has
some prophylactic scope. 24 4 Accepting arguendo the logic of the incen-
tive argument,2 45 realistically this room exists only if the Court is willing
to sever congressional excesses. Otherwise, the risk of total invalidation
may well lead Congress to err on the side of caution and stick closely to
prohibiting only clearly unconstitutional conduct. To put the point dif-
ferently, the effect of nonseverability is to unjustifiably chill Congress in
exercising the full scope of its powers under Section 5.
3. Judicial Manageability and the Judicial Role. - This leaves the final
instrumental justification for nonseverability: namely, that addressing
challenged Section 5 legislation on a case-by-case basis will prove burden-
some for the courts, improperly placing them in the position of rewriting
congressional legislation. 246 This argument carries particularly little
weight. First, ordinary severability doctrine already adequately addresses
the judicial role concern. Severability is inappropriate unless it repre-
sents a fair and reasonable interpretation of a statute rather than a rewrit-
ing of statutory text. Similarly, the ordinary presumption of severability
indicates that the judicial efficiency gains of assessing a statute's constitu-
tionality in a single proceeding do not on their own outweigh the institu-
tional concerns counseling for a case-by-case approach.
In addition, the judicial manageability problems the Court may face
in having to determine the constitutionality of Section 5 legislation on an
242. See supra notes 147-153 and accompanying text.
243. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997).
244. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727-28 (2003) ("Congress
may enact so-called prophylactic legislation ...."); id. at 756 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(noting Congress' power under Section 5 to enact prophylactic measures); see also
Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 2010-12 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Section 5 "does not authorize ... so-called 'prophylactic' measures").
245. The incentive argument assumes that members of Congress are more concerned
with ensuring the legislation they enact withstands judicial challenge than with the political
benefits gained simply by enacting legislation that their constituents or interest groups
desire. This seems a highly dubious assumption, thus raising an additional reason to reject
this argument for nonseverability. See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 71, 92-93; Vermeule, supra note 52, at 1962. Contra Fallon, Making Sense, supra
note 65, at 888-89 & n.221.
246. See The Supreme Court, 2003 Term-Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, State
Sovereign Immunity, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 248, 260, 266-67 (2004) (raising this criticism of
the Lane decision).
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as-applied basis are a direct function of the substantive standard the
Court has imposed in this context. Given that the scope of Congress'
power turns on the judicial scrutiny triggered by the underlying constitu-
tional right, it is inevitable that the same statute may be constitutional as
applied to protect one constitutional right and unconstitutional in regard
to another. Having thus created the situation where application-specific
assessments are necessary to determine if challenged legislation is consti-
tutional, the Court cannot readily complain about the resultant burdens
on the courts.
C. Other Congressional Power Contexts
This leaves the question of whether deviation from ordinary sever-
ability rules is appropriate in other congressional power contexts. The
greater rigor of the congruence-and-proportionality test compared to Ar-
ticle I analysis, which generally applies a far more deferential review even
when federalism concerns are at stake,2 47 makes the claim for federalism-
based nonseverability outside of Section 5 a particularly doubtful proposi-
tion. Notably, when the Court has employed a more restrictive analysis in
reviewing Article I legislation, such as the anticommandeering rule, it still
responds to finding unconstitutionality by severing the offending
provisions.2 48
Perhaps most importantly, nothing in the class-of-activities analysis
under the Commerce Clause mandates a nonseverability presumption
and corresponding use of Salerno-style facial challenges.2 4 9 Again, this
analysis does lend commerce power challenges a general character. A
court must go beyond the specific facts of the case at hand and instead
assess the generic nature of the activity at issue. Moreover, some efforts
to invalidate particular applications of commerce power legislation may
parse too finely. The activity at issue may be identified so narrowly as to
247. See Caminker, supra note 195, at 1134-41, 1186-96; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186, 217-18 (2003) (refusing to apply the congruence-and-proportionality test
outside of the Section 5 context).
248. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186-87 (1992).
249. Debate on this point has recently surfaced in the courts of appeals. Compare
United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1140-42 (9th Cir. 2003) (arguing that class-of-
activities analysis does not preclude as-applied challenges where activity in question is not
part of a larger enterprise), with United States v. Morales-De Jesfis, 372 F.3d 6, 18-22 (1st
Cir. 2004) (arguing that class-of-activities analysis requires a court to assess the economic
nature of the activity in question by reference to the general activity regulated by the
statute, but allowing other as-applied challenges), and United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d
1114, 1133-37 (9th Cir. 2003) (Trott, J., dissenting) (arguing that class-of-activities analysis
requires a court to assess whether the activity "generically described in the statute" has an
effect on interstate commerce and thus precludes as-applied challenges (emphasis
omitted)). The issue of whether as-applied challenges are available in the Commerce
Clause context was also mentioned during oral argument in Raich v. Ashcroft. Transcript of
Oral Argument at 6, 16, Raich v. Ashcroft (No. 03-1454), available at http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/oralarguments/argument-transcripts/03-1454.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
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not fairly constitute a discrete class. 250 Alternatively, even if a discrete
class of activity, it may be practically inseparable if congressional regula-
tion is to be effective. 25 1 Finally, ordinary severability analysis may pre-
clude efforts to segregate particular applications. But rarely will these
constraints entail that a court must examine all applications of a com-
merce power statute in order to determine its constitutionality. Hence,
notwithstanding the substantive requirements of the class-of-activities test,
as-applied challenges generally remain available in the commerce power
context, provided these challenges involve a challenge to some general
rule in the statute. 2 5 2
What then to make of Lopez and Morrison? Once more, the absence
of any express discussion of facial challenges or severability in these deci-
sions cautions against reading too much into their text. Yet their seeming
refusal to sever potentially constitutional applications of the statutes
therein challenged and resort to total invalidation is striking. Insofar as
their mode of analysis departs from ordinary severability doctrine, it
seems that Lopez and Morrison are in error. It is not clear, however, that
these decisions in fact represent such a departure. In both, limiting the
statutes to their legitimate field of operation would have required the
Court to, in essence, add a jurisdictional element. Arguably, this would
stray over the line from judicial narrowing to judicial rewriting of a chal-
lenged statute. 253 A variety of jurisdictional elements are often poten-
tially available to cure constitutional defects. In the School Zones Act, for
example, the possibilities ranged from requiring that the gun in question
250. This complaint might be lodged against the Ninth Circuit's decision in Stewart,
which treated possession of homemade machineguns as a distinct class of activity. See 348
F.3d at 1136-40.
251. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Raich v. Ashcroft, barring the application of
federal drug laws to cultivation and possession of marijuana for personal medical purposes,
352 F.3d 1222, 1234 (9th Cir. 2003), seems vulnerable for this reason, as does the Eleventh
Circuit's recent determination in United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042, 1067 (11 th Cir.
2004), that Congress lacks power to regulate local possession of child pornography. See
also United States v. Holston, 343 F.3d 83, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding federal
prohibition of mere possession of child pornography on the ground that Congress could
rationally conclude such a ban was necessary to enforce its regulation of the national
market in child pornography).
252. However, fact-specific claims of privilege and immunity-the traditional basis of
an as-applied challenge-are not totally excluded from commerce power analysis. In
United States v. Morrison, the Court essentially limited class-of-activity analysis and
aggregation to contexts involving economic activity. See 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000). Hence,
once a court determines that a given activity is noneconomic, the question then becomes
whether the specific instance of that activity at issue had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. See, e.g., Maxwell, 386 F.3d at 1059-60. In addition, courts regularly assess
whether the specific conduct at issue falls within the scope of commerce power legislation.
See, e.g., Morales-DeJesis, 372 F.3d at 18-21.
253. See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 479 (1995)
(refusing to craft nexus requirement to save unconstitutionally broad honoraria ban,
arguing "[w] e cannot be sure that our attempt to redraft the statute to limit its coverage...
would correctly identify the nexus Congress would have adopted").
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traveled in interstate commerce (the solution Congress subsequently
adopted) to demanding it be possessed in immediate connection with a
commercial activity. 2 5 4 Choosing which approach Congress would want
to take might well have exceeded proper judicial bounds; automatically
presuming that Congress would want to preserve the broadest possible
reach of the statute seems at odds with according Congress credit for
taking federalism concerns seriously. 2 5 5 Moreover, in the case of the
VAWA Congress did include ajurisdictional element in the Act's criminal
enforcement provision, suggesting that the absence of such an element in
the civil remedy provision was intentional. 256
Of course, at times the Court has engaged in seemingly radical statu-
tory surgery and reconstruction to save a statutory scheme after ruling
some of its provisions or applications unconstitutional. The recent deci-
sion in United States v. Booker is now the paradigm example. 2 57 The
Court's unwillingness to do so in Lopez and Morrison may relate to its
sense that the implication of facial invalidation of the latter statutes was
less severe, or perhaps an unarticulated (and undefended) reluctance to
engage in as extensive saving efforts where a statute's constitutional infir-
mity stemmed not from an independent constitutional prohibition, but
from its exceeding the constitutional grant of powers to Congress. At a
minimum, the Court's inconsistent approach to severability analysis un-
dermines the effort to justify Lopez and Morrison in severability analysis
terms.
CONCLUSION
The majority in Lane seems to have gotten it largely right. True, the
opinion gives too little explanation of how facial and as-applied chal-
lenges actually differ and of where its approach falls on the range of facial
and as-applied analysis. But the majority was correct on the critical issue:
In the Section 5 context, no reason exists-whether based in precedent,
the substantive content of the congruence-and-proportionality test, or in-
strumental concerns-to deviate from ordinary severability doctrine and
the general presumption of severability. States should be able to bring
facial challenges to Section 5 statutes-that is, challenges which attack
the general rule and requirements set forth in such legislation, as op-
254. In addition, as Lopez involved a criminal statute, the rule of lenity might counsel
against severability. See Vermeule, supra note 52, at 1968-69.
255. Cf. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858-59 (2000) (reading federal arson
statutes narrowly in part because of principle that courts should not presume Congress has
"significantly changed the federal-state balance in the prosecution of crimes" absent clear
evidence to that effect (internal quotation marks omitted)).
256. That Lopez and Morrison can be read to accord with ordinary severability doctrine
says nothing, of course, about whether these decisions are correct in their substantive
analyses of the challenged statutes' constitutionality-as to which the dissents in those
cases contain powerful criticisms. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 640-645, 654-55 (Souter,
J., dissenting).
257. See supra Part I.B.3.
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posed to challenges that focus on the facts of the controversy in the case
before the court. But once a court determines that the statute is constitu-
tional with respect to enforcing the constitutional right at issue in the
case at hand, the proper course is generally for the court to uphold this
application of the statute and not proceed to consider other applications.
The converse is also true: If a court holds the statute to exceed Congress'
power in regard to the right at issue, it should enjoin the legislation only
as so applied, leaving open whether the statute would be constitutional in
other contexts. While instances may exist where a statute has only one
type of application, examination of the Court's Section 5 cases makes
clear such occasions are likely rare.
The one qualifier is that under the ordinary rules of severability, a
court should only sever Section 5 legislation in this fashion if it deter-
mines that the statutes are readily susceptible to such a construction.
Where the Lane majority erred was in never engaging in such an inquiry
and instead simply relying on a tacit presumption of severability (al-
though that is often the Court's standard practice). Moreover, satisfying
severability analysis can be a significant hurdle. At a minimum, severabil-
ity case law demonstrates that the Court has varied in its willingness to
read statutes as supporting curative constructions. 258
Thus, a final question is whether denying the propriety of facial chal-
lenges and a nonseverability principle in the Section 5 context would
make much difference, given that the Court can reach the same result
through express application of severability analysis. The answer is yes, it
would make a significant difference. No doubt, the same separation-of-
powers and federalism concerns identified by many as animating the
Court's recent Section 5 decisions would lead it to take a stingy approach
to severability in some cases, and to conclude that severing potentially
unconstitutional applications would represent illegitimate judicial rewrit-
ing of a congressional statute. Critically, however, control over severabil-
ity lies largely with Congress. 2 59 Provided Congress makes clear that not
just unconstitutional provisions but unconstitutional applications are to
be deemed severable, 260 the Court's ability to facially invalidate Section 5
legislation will be significantly curtailed.
258. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
259. See Nagle, supra note 48, at 241-44 (describing evidence that Congress is aware
of severability and the impact of severability clauses); see also Shumsky, supra note 47, at
267-71 (arguing that courts should treat explicit congressional instructions regarding
severability as dispositive).
260. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 460-61 (1992) (holding that
"[s]everability clauses may easily be written to provide that if application of a statute to
some classes is found unconstitutional, severance of those classes permits application to
the acceptable classes").
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